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Tax Simplification:  So Necessary and So Elusive 
KENNETH H. RYESKY* 
The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain 
and not arbitrary.  The time of payment, the manner of payment, 
the quantity to be paid, ought to be clear and plain to the contribu-
tor, and to every other person.  Where it is otherwise every person 
subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the 
tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious 
contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some pre-
sent or perquisite to himself.  The uncertainty of taxation encour-
ages the insolence and favors the corruption of an order of men 
who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent 
nor corrupt.  The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, 
in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very consider-
able degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience 
of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of 
uncertainty.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cries for tax simplification have long been heard from presidents,2 leg-
islators,3 current and former government officials4 and the public.  The 
  
 * B.B.A., Temple University, 1977; M.B.A., La Salle University, 1982; J.D., Temple University, 
1986; M.L.S., Queens College CUNY, 1999; member of the Bar, New York, New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania; currently a solo practitioner Attorney in East Northport, NY, and Adjunct Assistant Professor, 
Department of Accounting & Information Systems, Queens College CUNY, Flushing, NY; formerly 
Attorney, Internal Revenue Service, Manhattan District. 
Unless otherwise indicated, opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author, and do not neces-
sarily represent the official position of any person, organization or entity with respect to which the 
author is or has been employed, associated or retained. 
 1. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Edwin Cannan, ed., Modern Amer. Lib., N.Y., 1937) 
(originally published in 1789), bk. V, ch. II, pt. II at 778 (Maxim II.). 
 2. E.g. President Ronald W. Reagan, The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, 
Growth and Simplicity at 1 (May 1985) (SuDoc No. Pr 40.2:T19) (“The system is too complicated 
[emphasis in original]“); President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual Budget Message to Congress: 
Fiscal Year 1960, 1959 Pub. Papers 36, 41 (“As the budget permits, additional reforms should be 
undertaken . . . wherever feasible to simplify the [tax] laws.”). 
 3. See e.g. 149 Cong. Rec. E851-01 (daily ed. May 1, 2003) (remarks of Rep. Neal); see also Dan 
Balz, Kerry Blasts Bush’s Tax Cuts, Offers Own Plan, Washington Post A-4 (Dec. 4, 2002) (reporting 
Senator John F. Kerry’s call for, inter alia, tax simplification). 
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judiciary has often expressed its frustrations in comprehending the tax stat-
utes.5  The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) itself has had occasion to 
hesitate and waver in its interpretation and application of the tax statutes,6 
and indeed, several IRS officials have admitted to retaining professional 
assistance to prepare their personal income tax returns.7 
Though nearly everyone seems to advocate tax simplification, the goal 
remains elusive.  Tax litigation continues to abound, and sometimes, where 
  
 4. See e.g. U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Tax System: Issues in Tax Compliance Burden, Pub. No. 
GAO/T-GGD-96-100, 4-5 (Apr. 3, 1996) (finding that of the Internal Revenue Code, coupled with 
frequent legislative changes, lead to taxpayer confusion, noncompliance, and impediment of IRS’s 
ability to enforce the tax laws.); Asides: Tax Revision (Editorials), Wall St. J. 32, col. 1 (Mar. 3, 1987) 
(quoting Jerome Kurtz, former Internal Revenue Commissioner:  “A taxpaying public that doesn’t 
understand the law is a taxpaying public that can’t comply with the law.”); Tax Report: Tax-Law Com-
plexity and Poor IRS Service Draw Fire from an IRS Official, Wall St. J. 1, col. 5 (Feb. 12, 1997) 
(reporting comments by IRS Taxpayer Advocate Lee R. Monks that tax law complexity is the cause of 
most taxpayer problems with the IRS); Tax Schedule D for Dammit!, Newsday (Long Island, NY) A4 
(Feb. 13, 1998) (reporting that the new rules for Schedule D of Form 1040 concededly confused even 
Robert Kobel, an experienced senior Public Affairs Officer for IRS Brooklyn District). 
 5. See e.g. Judge Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 Yale L.J. 167, 169 (1947): 
 
[T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance before my 
eyes in a meaningless procession:  cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon 
exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of—leave in 
my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed 
purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only af-
ter the most inordinate expenditure of time. Id. 
 
See Houston Textile Co. v. Commr., 173 F.2d 464, 464 (5th Cir. 1949) (“This petition brings up for 
solution one of those difficult jigsaw tax law puzzles all too common in the present deplorable crazy 
quilt patchwork state of the Internal Revenue.”); Cohen v. U.S., 995 F.2d 205, 209 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It 
is rare that tax law bears any recognizable relationship to common sense.”); Tkac v. U.S., 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16657 at *1-2 (Dist. Md. Aug. 1, 2002) (“Government counsel ‘dumped’ a collection of 
documents on the record and, in effect, left the Court to sort matters out on its own. Judges (and/or law 
clerks) unfamiliar with tax matters could find this a daunting task.”). 
 6. See e.g. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5811072330A (Nov. 7, 1958) (reversing prior telegraphic ruling that 
matches with  “unstained wooden sticks, tips of various colors, and . . . contained in a barrel-shaped 
box” and “long matches with unstained wooden sticks, tips of various colors, and . . . contained in a 
long cylindrical box” were taxable at the higher 5.5 cents per 1,000 instead of the standard 2 cents per 
1,000 under the then applicable I.R.C. § 4211 excise tax on matches (repealed June 21, 1965)). 
 7. Joy Vestal, Newsmaker: Carol Landy, Newsday (Long Island, NY) A22 (Apr. 11, 1995) (quot-
ing Carol Landy, Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, Brookhaven (Holtsville), NY:  “I 
don’t do my own tax return.  I’m afraid to make a mistake.”); Forbes 30 (Jan. 1, 1996) (reproduced in 
InfoTrac microfilm reel No. Bus. 84-E-2073 (Information Access Co.)) (reporting that then Internal 
Revenue Commissioner Fred Goldberg reportedly admitted to Rep. Christopher Cox (R. Calif.) to 
engaging an accountant to prepare his personal income tax returns); James Toedtman, Mr. Fix-It to the 
Rescue:  IRS Chief Takes on Agency, Taxpayers, Employees, Critics, Newsday (Long Island, NY) F8 
(Mar. 29, 1998) (reporting that then Internal Revenue Commissioner Charles O. Rossotti admitted to 
having his taxes prepared by professionals since 1970, when he started his own business); David Cay 
Johnston, Need Tax Help? So Do the Experts in Washington, N.Y. Times § 3, 8, col. 2 (Apr. 14, 1996) 
(reporting that then Internal Revenue Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson, a tax lawyer, uses 
professional help to prepare her income tax return); see also Daniel v. Commr., 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 151 
(1997) (reciting that the taxpayer, an IRS collections supervisor, had enlisted the help of a subordinate 
(albeit a dysfunctional one) in preparing a personal income tax return which reported a casualty loss). 
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words alone do not suffice, judges augment textual opinions with graphic 
illustration in order to effectively elucidate their decisions.8  The tax stat-
utes and regulation books continue to grow ever more voluminous,9 and 
the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)10 is replete with sections containing 
exceptions to the stated rule and to the listed exceptions.11  Not included in 
the Code proper, however, are several uncodified revenue statutes of sig-
nificant importance.12  A single transaction often gives rise to liability for 
diverse types of taxes.13 
  
 8. See Kenneth H. Ryesky, From Pens to Pixels:  Text-Media Issues in Promulgating, Archiving 
and Using Judicial Opinions, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 354, 360-361 (Fall 2002) and cases cited 
therein. 
 9. The familiar U.S.C.C.A.N. annual edition of the Internal Revenue Code (sometimes referred to 
as the “Red I.R.C.“) has grown from a single volume of 1,930 pages in the 1976 edition to two volumes 
of 1,754 and 1,210 pages, respectively, for the 2003 edition.  The U.S.C.C.A.N. companion Federal tax 
regulations publication (“Red Tax Regs“) has grown even more dramatically over the same period, 
from two volumes totaling 4,508 pages in 1976 to five volumes of 1,964, 1,942, 1,978, 1,891 and 1,641 
pages, respectively, in 2003.  The foregoing figures do not include the Roman numeral prefatory pages 
or the index pages.  
 10. Unless noted otherwise, the statutory section references in this Article will be to the Internal 
Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1986, as amended.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 
2095 (1986), redesignated the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
retaining consistency in most of the section numbers and providing that except where inappropriate, 
official reference to one shall entail reference to the other.  The 1986 Code was “not intended to change 
any substantive provision of the [1954 Code] not otherwise modified by [the Tax Reform Act of 
1986],” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841at II-837 (reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4925). 
Federal taxation is such a specialized area of the law that the Internal Revenue Code, codified at Title 
26 of the United States Code, is among tax practitioners and courts widely cited as “I.R.C.” instead of 
“26 U.S.C.”  See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, § P.5 at 16 and § 12.8.1 at 85 (Colum-
bia L. Rev. Assn., et al., eds., 17th ed., 2000); Association of Legal Writing Directors & Darby 
Dickerson, ALWD Citation Manual, pt. 3, § 14.2(b)(3) at 103 (Aspen L. & Bus. 2000); see also Andrea 
I. Castro, Overview of the Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Hospitals and Their For-Profit Subsidiaries: A 
Short-Sighted View Could Be Very Bad Medicine, 15 Pace L. Rev. 501, 501 n. 1 (1995). By similar 
convention, regulations issued by the Treasury Department pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code are 
frequently cited as “Treas. Reg.“ instead of “26 C.F.R.“ 
 11. See e.g. I.R.C. § 2035. “Adjustments for certain gifts made within 3 years of decedent’s death.” 
Id. The general rule in § 2035(a) includes such transfers in a decedent’s estate. Sections 2035(b) and 
2035(d) are statutory exceptions to the general rule set forth in § 2035(a). Sections 2035(d)(2) and 
2035(d)(3), however, set forth exceptions to the exceptions provided in sections 2035(b) and 2035(d); 
see also I.R.C. § 1031 (exception to the general rule that exchange of property is a taxable event, which 
has several exceptions and qualificatory subparagraphs). 
 12. See e.g. In re Hickok, 552 N.Y.S.2d 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (dealing with an uncodified tax 
statute, § 403(3) of Pub. L. 97-34, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (“ERTA”) relating to wills 
executed pre-ERTA), leave to appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 516 (N.Y. 1990); 303 West 42nd St. Ent. Inc. 
v. IRS, 181 F.3d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1999) (determining issues relating to uncodified section of Revenue 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600 § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86 (1978), relating to exemption from 
penalty for employers who, under certain circumstances, misclassify individuals as other than employ-
ees for tax purposes); Smith v. Commr., 275 F.3d 912, 912 (10th Cir. 2001) (ruling on applicability of 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, § 3463(a), 112 Stat. 
685, 767 (1998), requiring last date to petition Tax Court be included in income tax deficiency notices 
sent by IRS).  Statutes that have not been codified into the Internal Revenue Code nevertheless have the 
force of law if they appear in the United States Statutes at Large. Smith, 275 F.3d 912, 914 n. 1; see 
also U.S. Natl. Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993). 
 13. See e.g. Lazarus v. Commr., 58 T.C. 854 (1972), aff’d, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975). 
File: ryesky(macro) Created on:  6/28/2004 5:54:00 PM Last Printed: 6/30/2004 7:50:00 AM 
96 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 2, No. 2 
Several factors conjunctively operate to make and keep our tax system 
complex.  By way of specific examples, this article will discuss some of 
the dynamics that impede and counteract the tax simplification efforts of 
the executive and the legislative branches.  In doing so, the author does not 
purport that the cases, statutes, regulations or reports chosen for discussion 
are the only such examples.  Nor does the author intend to woodenly im-
pose any classification system, for the forces at work against tax simplifi-
cation often appear in many guises and are susceptible to diverse analyses 
and classifications; moreover, they often interact synergistically with one 
another.14   The author seeks here to advance the scholarly and practical 
understanding as to why taxation continues to resist simplification, by way 
of identifying and describing the actions of forces that complicate the taxa-
tion process. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT OF TAX STATUTES 
A. Reaction to Judicial Construction of Statutes 
The United States Congress has taken pains to enact confusing, ver-
bose and ambiguous tax statutes requiring complex logical and/or mathe-
matical gymnastics to arrive at the correct tax.  Many of these instances are 
modifications of statutes whose prior incarnations have been interpreted by 
the courts in a manner not consistent with legislative intent. 
Such was the case of the Internal Revenue Code Amendments of 1949 
on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of Spiegel v. Com-
missioner.15  There, Chicago merchant Sidney Spiegel placed approxi-
mately $1 million in trust for the benefit of his children and grandchil-
dren.16  There was no provision made for the disposition of the trust in the 
unlikely event that Spiegel survived all of his children and grandchildren, 
and so, the possibility of the trust reverting back to Spiegel was actuarially 
valued at approximately $70 dollars immediately before his death.17  Nev-
ertheless, because Mr. Spiegel had, by virtue of that remote possibility of 
reversion, not totally severed his ownership of the trust corpus for tax pur-
poses, the entire amount was included in his estate when he died, increas-
ing the estate tax due by over $450,000.18  Congress, outraged by the result 
  
 14. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1267 (1990). 
 15. 335 U.S. 701, 701 (1949). 
 16. Id.; At the time the trust was settled, there was no gift tax applicable and Spiegel’s grandchildren 
were yet to be born.  Id. at 719-720. 
 17. Id. at 733. 
 18. Id. at 734. 
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in Spiegel, included a provision in that year’s IRC amendments that rever-
sionary interests in property must exceed 5% in order to be includible in a 
decedent’s estate.19  Such Congressional modification of the statute was, to 
be sure, specifically invited by Justice Burton’s dissenting opinion in 
Spiegel.20  The five percent rule was continued in the IRC’s of 1954 and 
1986.21  A qualifying condition was imposed upon what had formerly been 
a simple rule (albeit a simple rule with a demonstrated potential for harsh 
draconian consequences).  Desirable as it is to prevent situations such as 
that in Spiegel where, comparatively speaking, a miniscule reversionary 
value would cost the estate a king’s ransom, the five percent rule appended 
to the statute by the 1949 amendment was in a sense a complication, and 
not a simplification, in the tax statute. 
Congressional dissatisfaction with the Spiegel decision was easily ar-
ticulable, but the rationality of Congress’s reaction to Edwards v. Slocum 22 
is not so clear.  In 1924, the taxpayer in Edwards convinced the United 
States Supreme Court that Congress did not intend to require complex and 
reiterative interrelated mathematical calculations in computing the amount 
of the Federal estate tax.23  Later that year, when Congress passed the Reve-
nue Act of 1924, it rejected the reasoning in Edwards by explicitly requiring 
that a deductible interest be reduced by any death taxes payable out of it,24 
effectively requiring the reiterative interrelated calculation.25   The Reve-
  
 19. Pub. L. No. 81-378, § 7 (1949) (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 811(c)).  See 
also Sen. Rpt. No. 81-831 (reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2172, 2180-2181 (1940)).  Also weighing 
in Congress’s action to amend § 811 was the United States Supreme Court decision in Commr. v. 
Church’s Est., 335 U.S. 632 (1949); 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179-2180. 
 20. Spiegel, 335 U.S. at 708-709 (Burton, J., dissenting): 
 
Today’s decision adds to the difficulties in this troubled field of estate tax law.  It may, 
however, serve a good purpose if it leads to a simultaneous consideration by Congress 
of the related fields of income, gift and estate taxation in connection with the creation 
or transfer of future interests.  Id. 
 
 21. I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2).  The subsection reads: 
 
§ 2037(a)(2)  the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property (but in 
the case of a transfer made before October 8, 1949, only if such reversionary interest 
arose by the express terms of the instrument of transfer), and the value of such rever-
sionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the 
value of such property.  Id. 
 
 22. Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924), aff’g, 287 F. 651, 654 (2d Cir. 1923). 
 23. Id. at 63. 
 24. Sen. Rpt.  68-398 (1924) (reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 2, 266, 290 (1924)) (rejecting the Edwards 
case by explicitly requiring that a deductible interest be reduced by any death taxes payable therefrom).  
 25. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 C.B. 275; see also Hartwick Col-
lege v. U.S., 801 F.2d 608, 611 - 612 (2d Cir. 1986); Martin v. U.S., 923 F.2d 504, 504 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Chiles v. U.S., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12704 **9-14 (Dist. Ore. 1985), aff’d, 843 F.2d 367, 367 (9th 
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nue Act of 1924 was enacted more than two decades before the invention 
of the automatic sequence electronic computer;26 accordingly, the “squirrel 
cage” arithmetic calculations using mutually dependent variables mandated 
by Congress had to be done manually. 
Legislative fixes for problem tax statutes, then, do not always make the 
taxes simpler. 
B. Political Influence 
This article leaves to others the tasks of setting forth detailed analyses 
of the political processes that affect tax legislation and/or listing the politi-
cal artifacts to be found the Internal Revenue Code.  There can be no deny-
ing, however, that foul or fair, much tax legislation is influenced by special 
interests.27 
Some private tax legislation is never codified into the IRC, and thus, 
has little if any lasting effect upon the tax system.  As an example, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 contains an obscure uncodified section known as the 
Jim Thompson Act.28  James H. W. Thompson, the legendary American 
business entrepreneur who developed the silk industry in Thailand, myste-
riously disappeared in 1967 while in Malaysia.29  Thompson’s property in 
Bangkok, initially bequeathed to a nephew, came into the hands of a chari-
table entity known as the Jim Thompson Foundation, which now operates a 
museum to preserve Thompson’s house and chattels.30  The indirect trans-
fer to charity apparently did not comply with the requirements for a valid 
  
Cir. 1988); Est. of Bush v. U.S., 618 F.2d 741, 741 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Est. of Bradford v. Commr., 84 
T.C.M. (CCH) 337 (2002).  
 26. In 1946, the United States Army took delivery from the University of Pennsylvania of the Elec-
tronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC); see e.g. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tel. Labs., Inc., 
208 F. Supp. 598, 600-601 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal dismissed, 317 F.2d 491, 491 (2d Cir. 1963); Alice 
R. Burks & Arthur W. Burks, The First Electronic Computer: The Atanasoff Story 105 (U. Mich. Press 
1988); see also Martin H. Weik, “The ENIAC Story,” Ordnance, J. of the Am. Ordnance Assn. (Jan-
Feb. 1961) (republished at http://ftp.arl.army.mil/~mike/comphist/eniac-story.html) (accessed May 25, 
2004). 
 27. See e.g. Philip M. Stern, The Rape of the Taxpayer (Random House, 1973); William Blatt, The 
American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 Tax L. Rev. 
287, 287 (1996); Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreas-
ing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987); Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: 
The Political Influence of American Small Business, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 15 (1996). 
 28. Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514 § 1423, 100 Stat. 2717. 
 29. A U.S. Millionaire Missing in Malaysia, N.Y. Times 1 (Mar. 28, 1967); The Jim Thompson 
House, The Jim Thompson Legacy, http://www.jimthompsonhouse.org/museum/index.html (accessed 
May 25, 2004). 
 30. Silk Man’s Home to Keep His Art, N.Y. Times 4 (July 8, 1968); The Jim Thompson House, The 
James H. W. Thompson Foundation, http://www.jimthompsonhouse.org/museum/index.html (accessed 
May 25, 2004). 
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charitable estate tax deduction,31 and so, a steep estate tax bill was due to 
the IRS.  With the obvious help of the Thompson family’s political con-
nections,32 the Tax Reform Act of 1986 gave a private remedy to the finan-
cial problems of the Thompson’s estate and foundation, providing that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other law or any rule of law (including res judicata, 
laches, or lapse of time),” the property which was Jim Thompson’s and 
which was transferred to the Foundation would be eligible for the charita-
ble deduction with respect to the Estate Tax. 33 
But some “private relief” tax provisions have actually achieved 
stealthy codification into the Internal Revenue Code.  The old I.R.C. § 
1240 is one such example. It read: 
Amounts received from the assignment or release by an employee, 
after more than 20 years’ employment, of all his rights to receive, 
after termination of his employment and for a period of not less 
than 5 years (or for a period ending with his death), a percentage of 
future profits or receipts of his employer shall be considered an 
amount received from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held 
for more than 6 months if - 
(1) such rights were included in the terms of the employ-
ment of such employee for not less than 12 years, 
(2) such rights were included in the terms of the employ-
ment of such employee before the date of enactment of 
this title, and 
(3) the total of the amounts received in one taxable year 
and after the termination of such employment.34 
 
It would seem that very few could fulfill of the conditions of this statu-
tory section, but one person who was able to save approximately $2 mil-
lion by having his lump sum severance payment taxed as a capital gain 
instead of ordinary income under the provision was the very person for 
whom the statute was specifically tailored, Hollywood mogul Louis B. 
  
 31. Cf. e.g. Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Commr., 72 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1934) (disallowing charitable 
deduction from estate for bequest to decedent’s sons, subject to prior verbal understanding that sons 
would give the funds to charities), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 604 (1934).  
 32. Gary Klott, How Special Breaks Got in the Tax Bill, N.Y. Times 35 (June 14, 1986). 
Thompson’s maternal grandfather, for whom he was named, was U.S. Civil War general cum diplomat 
James Harrison Wilson.  Jim Thompson House, Life and Legend, Key Influences on Thompson’s Early 
Life, http://www.jimthompsonhouse.org/life/index.html (accessed May 25, 2004). 
 33. Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514 § 1423, 100 Stat. 2717. 
 34. I.R.C. § 1240, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1911(a)(139), 90 Stat. 
1787 (1976). 
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Mayer.35 Unlike the Jim Thompson Act, which directly mentions its bene-
ficiary by name,36 the former I.R.C. § 1240 was totally devoid of any men-
tion of the name of its intended beneficiary.37 
C. Statutory Redesignations 
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198038 made several amendments to the 
I.R.C.  One such amendment respectively redesignated I.R.C. §§ 
6103(e)(5) and (e)(6) as I.R.C. §§ 6103(e)(6) and (e)(7).39  Prior to 24 De-
cember 1980, I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6) was the statute that authorized the IRS to 
permit certain disclosures under the Freedom of Information Act if it were 
determined “that such disclosure would not seriously impair tax admini-
stration.”40  Since 24 December 1980, I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6) has referred to 
the statutory subsection that permits disclosure to a duly authorized repre-
sentative of the taxpayer, a provision that had been designated as I.R.C. § 
6103(e)(5) before Bankruptcy Tax Act.41 
The Bankruptcy Tax Act redesignations have made tax research more 
difficult, confusing and subject to error.  A key word search on databases 
such as LEXIS or Westlaw for I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6), if not properly date 
restricted, will hit cases that deal with the post-Bankruptcy Tax Act version 
of the statute42 and cases that deal with the pre-Bankruptcy Tax Act ver-
sion of the statute.43 
Such redesignations can be especially complicative and confusing if 
they occur during the litigation.44  As the Fifth Circuit noted in Chamber-
lain,45 
  
 35. Stern, supra n. 27, at 40-44; It has been reported that in 1966, Dow Jones CEO Bernard Kilgore 
fortuitously qualified under all of the conditions set forth in the statute that had been tailored specifi-
cally for Louis B. Mayer, and benefited accordingly.  Five-eight and Bald-Headed, Forbes, June 1, 
1987, p. 86. 
 36. See supra nn. 29-33 and accompanying text. 
 37. The Congressional report on the repeal of I.R.C. § 1240 did, however, mention Louis B. Mayer 
by name.  H.R. Rep. No. 94-658 (1976) (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3291)  (“This amendment 
repeals the so-called Louis B. Mayer provisions . . . . Since the provision contains narrow restrictions, 
including the requirement that the rights be created before August 16, 1954, it is believed that it has no 
applicability today.”). 
 38. P.L. 96-589 (1980). 
 39. Id. at § 3(c)(1). 
 40. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7) (2003) (formerly codified at I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6)). 
 41. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6) (2003) (formerly codified at I.R.C. § 6103(e)(5)). 
 42. Iacoe v. IRS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12809 at *13 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Sharer v. U.S., 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2439 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
 43. E.g. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 834 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 
(1979); Kanter v. IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812, 824 n. 21 (N.D. Ill 1977).  
 44. See e.g. Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 526 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 45. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 834 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 
(1979). 
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After the district court entered its orders herein, Congress substan-
tially amended both the FOIA and the Internal Revenue Code in 
ways that directly affect this litigation. The Government in the 
Sunshine Act, enacted September 13, 1976, significantly narrowed 
the scope of Exemption 3 of the FOIA, while the Tax Reform Act 
of 1976 enacted October 4, 1976, completely revised section 6103 
of the Internal Revenue Code and created a comprehensive scheme 
for regulating the release of tax returns and information collected 
to determine tax liability.46 
Several other paragraphs of I.R.C. § 6103 have similarly been redesig-
nated,47 as have numerous other paragraphs and subsections of the Code.48  
Moreover, where it makes reference to statutory sections and paragraphs in 
other titles of the United States Code, the I.R.C’s must be amended to re-
flect redesignations by Congress of such sections and/or paragraphs in the 
other titles.49  On account of such Congressional tinkering with statutory 
redesignations, legal research of the Code for litigation and other purposes 
is akin to gunning for a moving target from a moving platform. 
Diverse factors and forces thus motivate Congress to enact taxation 
statutes complex in their logic and/or requiring complexities in compliance 
and administration. 
 III. COMPLEX REGULATIONS BY THE TREASURY 
Owing to its interaction with more than 250 million taxpayers an-
nually, the Internal Revenue Service . . . has a robust administra-
tive practice, characterized by a panoply of multi-faceted and 
multi-purposed administrative pronouncements and positions. 
Among these are Treasury regulations (both interpretative and leg-
  
 46. Id. 
 47. P.L. 100-485, § 701(b)(1) (redesignating I.R.C. § 6103(l)(12) as I.R.C. § 6103(l)(11)); P.L. 98-
369, § 453(b)(6) (redesignating I.R.C. § 6103(l)(7) as I.R.C. § 6103(l)(8)); P.L. 97-248, § 356(a) (re-
designating I.R.C. § 6103(i)(6) as I.R.C. § 6103(i)(7)); P.L. 97-248, § 358(a) (redesignating I.R.C. § 
6103(i)(7)(B) (as redesignated by § 356(a) of the Act) as I.R.C. § 6103(i)(7)(C)). 
 48. The author’s keyword LEXIS search for “redesignated” in the “History” field of 26 U.S.C. cites 
yielded 588 hits (Jan. 4, 2004). 
 49. See e.g. Museum and Library Services Act of 2003, P.L. 108-81, § 503, 117 Stat. 991, 1003-
1004 (Sept. 25, 2003) (amending I.R.C. § 170(e)(6)(b)(i)(III) to reflect the redesignation of 20 U.S.C. § 
9122(2)(A) to 20 U.S.C. § 9122(1)(A)). 
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islative), revenue rulings, private letter rulings, technical advice 
memoranda and General Counsel Memoranda.50 
Federal tax regulations are the product of a relatively complex rule-
making process.  This is so, in part, on account of the hierarchical structure 
of and between the IRS and the Treasury Department.  The IRS is an organ 
of the Department of the Treasury, empowered as prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury (though its chief executive officer, the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, is appointed by the President, subject to approval by 
the Senate).51  Nevertheless, it is the Secretary of the Treasury who is ulti-
mately responsible for enforcing and administering the federal tax laws52 
and indeed, many sections of the I.R.C. specifically permit or require “the 
Secretary” to promulgate regulations.53 
The process of promulgating federal tax rules and regulations involves 
personnel from both the IRS and the Treasury Department.54  Representa-
tives from both the IRS and the Treasury itself collaborate to conduct the 
public hearings for proposed tax regulations.55 
Critics have found the tax rulemaking process to be overly complex 
routine that produces overly complex rules.56 
It has now become disgustingly common for young lawyers to 
spend several years at Treasury working on complex regulations 
projects—creating obscurity for its own sake—in order to be able 
later to market their skills at interpreting their own work. The 
  
 50. Vons Companies, Inc. v. U.S., 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (Fed. Cl. 2001), modified, 2001 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 241 (Fed. Cl. 2001).  The “panoply of multi-faceted and multi-purposed administrative pro-
nouncements and positions” also includes Determination Letters, Opinion Letters, Information Letters 
and Closing Agreements. See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 601.201.  Courts will even give due regard to IRS 
training materials, and to public or special audience speeches by high-ranking IRS or Treasury offi-
cials.  See Vinson & Elkins v. Commr., 99 T.C. 9, 58-59 (1992), aff’d, 7 F.3d 1235 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 51. I.R.C. § 7802. 
 52. I.R.C. § 7801. 
 53. E.g. I.R.C. § 1(f)(1) (mandating that “the Secretary shall prescribe” tax tables to phase-out the 
marriage penalty); I.R.C. §7872(h) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section”) (emphasis added).  The author’s LEXIS 
keyword search of the Internal Revenue Code for the phrase “Secretary shall prescribe” yielded 273 
hits (Jan. 5, 2004). 
 54. Treas. Reg. § 601.601; see also Carole C. Berry, Sub S One Class of Stock Requirement: Rule-
making Gone Wrong, 44 Cath. U.L. Rev. 11, 16–20 (1994). 
 55. See e.g. John E. Hembera, Jr., Witness Suggests Changes to Proposed Estate Tax Filing Regs, 
90 Tax Notes 583 (Jan. 29, 2001) (reporting that government panel at the Jan. 24, 2001 hearing on 
proposed changes to Treas. Reg. 20.6081-1, at which the author of this article testified, “consisted of 
Katherine Mellody and Mary Berman from the IRS and Beth Kaufman from the Treasury Depart-
ment”). 
 56. See e.g. Berry, supra n. 54, at 19-20. 
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worse the Treasury product, the more valuable the draftsman be-
comes to private firms and others.57 
Even a seemingly simple Code section can be made complex by the 
regulations and pronouncements of the IRS and the Treasury.  One exam-
ple is the 87-word I.R.C. § 107, quite laconic by I.R.C. standards, which 
reads in its entirety:  
I.R.C. § 107. Rental value of parsonages. 
 
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not in-
clude— 
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his com-
pensation; or 
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to 
the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent 
such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, 
including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the 
cost of utilities. 58 
The noun “minister,” when not used in the governmental or diplomatic 
sense, means “[a] person authorized by a Christian church to perform reli-
gious function.”59  Moreover, the word “gospel” refers collectively to the 
first four books of the Christian bible.60  Accordingly, Constitutional issues 
notwithstanding, a facial reading of the statute would seem to exclude from 
its ambit a person whose employment consists of carrying out sacerdotal 
functions of a non-Christian religious denomination whose venerated writ-
ings do not include the books of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. 
Thus, a tax attorney who has been retained by a Jewish rabbi would, of 
course, look first to the applicable Treasury Regulations to determine 
whether his or her client might benefit from I.R.C. § 107, notwithstanding 
the language in which the statute has been couched by Congress.  The at-
torney then turns to Treasury Regulation § 1.107-1, relatively wieldable at 
less than 600 words, which further clarifies that “[I]n order to qualify for 
the exclusion, the home or rental allowance must be provided as remunera-
  
 57. Erik M. Jensen, Food for Thought and Thoughts About Food: Can Meals and Lodging Provided 
to Domestic Servants be for the Convenience of the Employer?, 65 Ind. L.J. 639, 645 n. 34 (1990). 
 58. I.R.C. § 107.  
 59. Black’s Law Dictionary 1011 (7th ed., West 1999) (emphasis added). The definition in the 5th 
and 6th edition reads “[a] person ordained according to the usages of some church or associated body 
of Christians for the preaching of the gospel and filling the pastoral office.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
898-899 (5th ed., West 1979); Id. at 996 (6th ed., West 1990). 
 60. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 504 (10th ed., Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1997). 
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tion for services which are ordinarily the duties of a minister of the gospel.  
In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such 
determination.”61  We are thus directed to Treasury Regulation § 
1.1402(c)-5, whose verbosity score tops 1,700 words, and which sets forth 
various helpful but, by now, complex criteria, including “If a minister is 
performing service in the conduct of religious worship or the ministration 
of sacerdotal functions, such service is in the exercise of his ministry 
whether or not it is performed for a religious organization.”62 
In light of the well known Constitutional prohibitions against religious 
discrimination, the ambiguous phrase “minister of the gospel” and its elu-
cidation in Treasury Regulation § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(iii) should be con-
strued as a religion-neutral provision allowing a Jewish rabbi and other 
clergy of other religions the benefit of the parsonage allowance provided in 
I.R.C. § 107.63  All doubt on that score was removed in 1978, when the 
IRS specifically ruled that a Jewish congregational rabbi came within the 
ambit of I.R.C. § 107,64 and the IRS subsequently ruled that a Jewish con-
gregational cantor may, under certain circumstances, likewise find shelter 
in the shadow beneath the wings of § 107.65  Accordingly, Jewish rabbis 
and cantors will be pleased to know that they are also considered to be 
ministers of the gospel, an appellation which would be considered well 
nigh insulting in any context other than that of I.R.C. § 107. 
If the 87 words that comprise I.R.C. § 107 can spawn so much com-
plexity in their supporting regulations, then the potential for trouble posed 
by Code sections of greater verbosity is as obvious as it is daunting. 
IV. COMPLEXITIES IN ADMINISTRATION 
In addition to the complexities in identifying taxable events and com-
puting the correct tax, there is also much complexity to be found in tax 
administration.  Even where the taxable event and the amount of the tax are 
clearly specified, complications can and do arise in the administration of 
the tax. 
  
 61. Treas Reg. § 1.107-1(a). 
 62. Treas Reg. § 1.1420(c)-5(b)(2)(iii). 
 63. See U.S. v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1838). 
 64. Rev. Rul. 58-221, 1958-1 C.B. 53. 
 65. Rev. Rul. 78-301, 1978-2 C.B. 103.  This Revenue Ruling was a reversal of the IRS’s prior 
position taken in Rev. Rul. 61-213, 1961-2 C.B. 27, after losing more than once in the Tax Court on the 
issue.  See Silverman v. Commr., 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8851 (8th Cir. 1973), aff’g 57 T.C. 727 
(1972); Salkov v. Commr., 46 T.C. 190 (1966). 
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The annual half-shekel per capita tax levied while the Temple stood in 
Jerusalem is instructive.  Though this tax was clearly specified as to inci-
dence and amount – one half-shekel to be paid by every man over twenty 
years of age66 – there were potentially complicating administrative matters 
that came into play.  The entire amount was to be remitted in a single pay-
ment and not in partial payments.67  A significant number of people paid 
their tax in coins other than the standard shekel used in the Temple, and 
provisions were thus necessary to address the exchange of coins.68  The 
collected funds were often transmitted via an intermediary, and procedures 
for doing so were defined,69 as were consequences for failure of the inter-
mediary to properly pay over the tax.70  And, of course, given the universal 
human distaste for paying taxes,71 there needed to be a tax collection sys-
tem which efficiently facilitated voluntary compliance but which was pre-
pared to resort to force if necessary to ensure payment of the half-shekel.72 
Even a conceptually simple tax such as the half-shekel can thus en-
twine itself in administrative considerations, which, given today’s techno-
  
 66. Exodus 30:13–15. 
 67. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Shekalim ch. 1, ¶ 1 at 94 (Philip Birnbaum, trans., Hebrew Publg. 
Co., N.Y. 1967) (c. 1180).  Cf. Ark. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 90-040, 1990 Ark. AG LEXIS 45 (Feb. 1, 1990) 
(ruling that county tax collectors are not required to accept partial payments of real property taxes); 
Mich. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 5777, 1979-80 Op. Atty. Gen. Mich. 983, 1980 Mich. AG LEXIS 60 (Sept. 
10, 1980) (same). 
 68. Talmud (Bab.), ch. I, Mishnah 6 at 232 (Leo Jung, trans., I. Epstein, ed., Traditional Press, N.Y. 
1983) (“The following are liable [to pay] a surcharge [to cover the costs of currency exchange] . . . If a 
man gave a sela’ and received a shekel, he is liable to pay two surcharges.”);  cf. Treas. Reg. §§ 
301.6316-1 through 301.6316-8 (setting forth regulations addressing particulars regarding payments, 
refunds and credits with respect to federal taxes paid in foreign currencies). 
 69. See Talmud (Bab.), supra n. 68, ch. II, Mishnah 1 at 233 (“Shekels may be changed into darics 
in order to [lighten] the load of the journey [to the Temple].”); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6302 (setting forth 
regulations for the use of government depositary banks in connection with certain tax payments). 
 70. See Id., Mishnah 2 at 235 (“If a man gave his shekel to his fellow to pay it on his behalf, but [his 
fellow] paid it on behalf of himself . . . [his fellow] is guilty of sacrilege.”). Cf. I.R.C. § 6672. 
 71. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays, Politics (1844) (reprinted in Ralph 
Waldo Emerson: Essays and Lectures 567 (Joel Porte ed., The Library of America, N.Y. 1983)); also 
in 5 The Harvard Classics: Essays and English Traits at 247 (Chas. W. Eliot ed., Collier & Son, N.Y. 
1909) (“Of all debts, men are least willing to pay the taxes.”). 
 72. See Maimonides, supra n. 67, ch. 1, ¶ 9 at 94-95: 
 
On the first of Adar announcement is made concerning the payment of shekel dues, so 
that each individual may prepare his half-shekel and be ready to pay it.  On the fif-
teenth of Adar, the money-changers sit down in each town and gently request every-
one to pay.  They accept from everyone who offers them the half-shekel, without using 
compulsion against anyone who does not.  On the twenty-fifth of Adar, they sit down 
in the Temple to enforce collection.  From then on, payment is obtained by force from 
those who have not yet paid.  Anyone who refuses to pay is subjected to compulsion 
by levy; a pledge is taken from him forcibly, even the garment he is wearing. Id. 
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logical state of the art, can only further complicate the tax system.73  Some 
of these considerations will now be discussed. 
A. Taxpayer Resistance to Taxation 
As previously mentioned, the taxpayer’s disdain for the taxation proc-
ess is nearly always a given.74  Accordingly, there is normally some degree 
of resistance to taxation on the part of the payer.  Against such a backdrop, 
fostering the American system of voluntary compliance75 with the tax laws 
can be quite a challenge, for it necessarily entails the delicate balance of 
encouraging the taxpayer to come forward (albeit not necessarily with en-
thusiasm)76 against the implicit threat of uncomfortable consequences if the 
taxpayer fails to discharge his or her duty.77  
  
 73. Plastic credit cards as used in modern society were, of course, unknown in the days of the Tem-
ple, but one can easily imagine, at such time as the Temple is rebuilt and the half-shekel tax reinsti-
tuted, the payment of that tax via credit card.  Provisions regulating credit card payments of the half-
shekel tax will, no doubt, need to be promulgated. Cf. Treas. Reg.  § 301.6311-2 (regulating the pay-
ment of federal taxes by credit card and debit card). 
 74. See Maimonides, supra, n. 72 and accompanying text. 
 75. See e.g. Guide to the Internal Revenue Service for Congressional Staff, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1273, at 
4 (Jan. 1996), SuDoc No. T22.44/2: 1273/996 (“[Voluntary compliance] means that taxpayers are 
expected to comply with the law without being compelled to do so by action of a federal agent; it does 
not mean that the taxpayer is free to decide whether or not to comply with the law.”). 
 76. Belli v. Commr., 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1172, 1181 (1989) (“Expressing one’s feelings about the IRS . 
. . is not an element of tax fraud; if it were, our Federal prisons undoubtedly would be brimming with 
such ‘tax convicts.’ We fail to discern any requirement that taxpayers must enjoy or look forward to 
paying their taxes.”). 
 77. See I Edward Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 493 (John B. Bury, 
ed., Heritage Press 1946) (originally published 1788) (also available at http://www.earthops.org/gib-
bons/2dfre10.html (accessed May 25, 2004)): 
 
The secret wealth of commerce, and the precarious profits of art or labor, are suscepti-
ble only of a discretionary valuation, which is seldom disadvantageous to the interest 
of the treasury; and as the person of the trader supplies the want of a visible and per-
manent security, the payment of the imposition, which, in the case of a land-tax, may 
be obtained by the seizure of property, can rarely be extorted by any other means than 
those of corporal punishments. Id 
 
Maimonides, supra n. 67, ch. 1, ¶ 9, at 94-95; Rita Zeidner, From Grizzly to Cuddly, Oct. 1992 Govt. 
Exec. Mag. 12, 17 (quoting Natwar Gandhi, Associate Director for Tax Policy, U.S. General Account-
ing Office:  “Kind words can do a lot, but kind words and a gun can go a lot further.”); see also Illinois 
Dept. of Revenue, Letter Ruling IT 92-0191 (GIL) (Oct. 8, 1992), (available at 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/legalinformation/letter/rulings/it/1992/920191.pdf (accessed May 25, 
2004) (“Penalties and interest are imposed to aid the Department in the timely collection of the proper 
amount of taxes due. Without the ability to enforce timely payment of tax obligations, the State of 
Illinois would incur an enormous financial detriment.”). 
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Taxpayer resistance against taxation personnel takes on various forms.  
At worst, it amounts to physical violence78 or murder.79  Not quite reaching 
such extremes, many individuals known as “tax protesters”80 engage in all 
sorts of frivolous and vexatious court actions.81  Interestingly enough, 
many of the same frivolous arguments used by tax protesters in the United 
States have been put to analogous use by tax protesters in other countries.82  
Such tax protest actions do not expedite the taxation process, whether in 
the United States or elsewhere.  Acts of tax resistance, such as refusal to 
  
 78. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Gearing, 83 Mass. 595 (1861) (Conviction of assault upon deputy 
sheriff attempting to collect taxes); Mendenhall v. U.S., 119 P. 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911) (defendant 
convicted of assaulting with intent to kill a city marshal in tax collection dispute); see also Man Shot 
Official over Stadium Tax, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette A5 (July 14, 1998) (reporting statements by defen-
dant at sentencing hearing that he had shot a Maricopa County, AZ supervisor because of her support 
of a sales tax to fund construction of Arizona Diamondbacks baseball stadium). 
 79. See e.g. People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345, 350-351 (1881) (affirming capital murder conviction in 
which defendant and other ex-convicts had conspired “to commit larceny, burglary, and robbery, and 
particularly, to rob the Tax Collector of [Mendocino] county, and to resist by force any who might 
attempt to interfere with them or to capture them”); see also David Lyons, Trial is in Miami, But Law is 
Italy’s, Natl. L. J. A8  (May 11, 1998) (reporting trial testimony in Miami, in prosecution of Italian 
national by Italian judicial system, for murder of Miami sales tax collector who had attempted to collect 
from defendant’s business). 
 80. See e.g. Coleman v. Commr., 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986): 
 
‘Tax protesters’ have convinced themselves that wages are not income, that only gold 
is money, that the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional, and so on.  These beliefs 
all lead -- so tax protesters think -- to the elimination of their obligation to pay taxes.  
The government may not prohibit the holding of these beliefs, but it may penalize 
people who act on them. Id. 
 
 81. See e.g. Burnett v. Commr., 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 811, 813 (1994) (“Petitioner testified that he has 
not filed a tax return since 1980, and plans to litigate each and every notice of deficiency he receives 
with the same arguments.”); Harrell v. Commr., 75 T.C.M. (CCH), 2458, 2460 (1998) (“Petitioner has 
been before this and other courts on income tax matters on numerous occasions, as shown in table 1.”),  
aff’d, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19886 (7th Cir. 1999); Webb v. Commr., 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1273 (1993), 
aff’d, 95-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,127 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Marcus Farbenblum, The IRS and the 
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts of 1974 43-56 (1991) (“The Tax Protest Movement”).  
 82. Cf. e.g. O’Toole v. Commr., 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 471 (2002) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that the 
IRS assessment was invalid because it omitted the apostrophe in his name) with Commr. of Inland 
Revenue v. Boyton, 2001 NZDCR LEXIS 170, D.C. REG. 1126 (Dist. Ct. Upper Hutt, 2001) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that the New Zealand Inland Revenue assessment was invalid because it spelled 
his name “Craig Gordon Boyton” instead of ‘‘Craig-Gordon: Boyton’’(with hyphen and colon as 
indicated)); cf. e.g. Lister v. U.S., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20430 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting tax pro-
tester’s arguments that the Federal Income Tax is unconstitutional) with Matchett v. Dep. Commr. of 
Taxn., [2000] NSWSC 975, 2000 NSW LEXIS 350 (rejecting Australian tax protester’s arguments that 
the Australian Income Tax Act is unconstitutional); cf. e.g. Marsh v. Commr., 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1327 
(2000) (rejecting tax protester argument that native Hawaiians are not obligated to pay taxes), aff’d, 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1354 (9th Cir. 2002); Avery-Carter v. Commr., 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1596 (1993) 
(same, African-American); Hill v. Commr., 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 13 (1995) (same, Native-American) with 
Kaihau v. New Zealand Inland Rev. Dept. [1990] 3 NZLR 344 (Highcourt, Auckland, 1990) (rejecting 
tax protester’s argument that he is exempt from New Zealand taxation because he is a Maori). 
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divulge a Social Security Number to a prospective employer,83 or filing 
altered tax forms84 obstruct the bureaucracy that administers the taxes.  
Accordingly, those who seek to simplify our taxes must reckon with resis-
tance to taxation by the taxpayer (or non-payer). 
B. Management of Sociological Considerations 
The IRS (or, for that matter, a state or local taxation authority) is not 
only a fiscal system and a technical system, but is also a social system; 
and, as is the case with other business or governmental organizations, the 
social interactions of the taxation personnel, whether amongst themselves 
or with the public, cannot be ignored when implementing taxation policy.85  
Positive public perceptions are critical to the performance of the IRS’s 
mission.86  Thus, IRS employees, and employees of state taxation authori-
ties, must be held to a higher standard in their personal compliance with the 
tax laws in order to foster tax compliance from the public at large,87 and to 
maintain order within the ranks of the taxation authority itself. 88 
  
 83. See Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 895 (2000); Balt-
galvis v. Newport News Shipbuilding, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 414 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 84. Williams v. Commr., 114 T.C. 136 (2000). 
 85. See e.g. John V. Murray & Frank A. Stickney, The Human Factor in Matrix Management, in 
Matrix Mgt. Sys. Handbook 231–254 (David I. Cleland, ed., Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1984). 
 86. See e.g. Pres. Harry S. Truman, Annual Message to Congress:  Fiscal Year 1953, 1953 Pub. 
Papers 63, 112 (“The maintenance of public confidence in the tax collection process is essential to our 
tax system.”). 
 87. See Kenneth H. Ryesky, Of Taxes and Duties: Taxing the System with Public Employees’ Tax 
Obligations, 31 Akron L. Rev. 349, 357-365 (1998). 
 88. See Brief for Respondent at 55, Kooi v. Chu, 517 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1987) 
(No. 53842) ((microformed on Fiche No. 3-87-466, Micro Copy, Inc., Rochester, NY) (Affidavit of 
Roderick G. W. Chu, New York State Commissioner of Taxation & Finance, at 8)): 
 
All individuals employed by the Department [of Taxation & Finance] are either di-
rectly or indirectly charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the 
State’s tax laws.  It is vital to the integrity of the Department and to the equitable, fair, 
and effective administration of the State’s tax laws that all officers and employees of 
the Department performing such duties be above reproach with respect to the require-
ment to file New York State personal income tax returns pursuant to Tax Law § 651.  
Toleration of violation by any such officer or employee carries with it the risk of a 
creeping rot within the Department itself, with a consequent serious adverse effect on 
the morale of those officers and employees within the Department who are in full 
compliance with the tax laws [emphasis added]. Id. 
 
The disintegration of order and morale amongst taxation personnel has long been known to imperil the 
stability of any government, democratic or otherwise.  See 2 M. Rostovtzeff, The Social & Economic 
History of the Hellenistic World 724-726 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967) (discussing how conflict and 
chaos among tax collection hierarchy contributed to the decline and fall of the Ptolemaic dynasty in 
Egypt). 
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Confidentiality of tax return information is necessary “to facilitate tax 
enforcement by encouraging the taxpayer to make full and truthful declara-
tions in his return, without fear that his statements will be revealed or used 
against him for other purposes.”89  This is especially so where the tax in-
volved is the income tax as we know it in America, because the tax exam-
iner is typically privy to, or else can readily deduce, certain personal in-
formation such as names of family members, employer, medical situation, 
the political, social and religious leanings of the taxpayer’s favorite chari-
ties (and, by inference, such leanings of the taxpayer), and other personal 
data that would be unavailable and irrelevant to the administration of an 
impost such as an excise tax or a sales tax paid at a merchant’s cash regis-
ter.  Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that I.R.C. § 6103, dealing with the 
confidentiality and disclosure of returns and return information, is a very 
verbose and complex statutory section whose legislative history is replete 
with frequent amendment and modification.90  Even where taxpayer infor-
mation is not disclosed outside the IRS, the widespread “tax snooping”91 
abuse by IRS personnel has so imperiled public confidence in the system 
that Congress enacted the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act to criminal-
ize the willful unauthorized access of taxpayer files by IRS employees and 
others, and to provide a cause of action for damages for taxpayers whose 
tax information is so accessed.92 
The effectiveness of the IRS’s control against abusive actions by its 
agents and employees against the taxpayer has oft been questioned.93  A 
  
 89. Webb v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 319 P.2d 621, 624 (Cal. 1957). 
 90. See supra nn. 39-46 and accompanying text.  There were no confidentiality privileges for tax-
payers under the first effective Federal income tax, instituted to help finance the Civil War, which in 
fact provided that “lists, valuations and enumerations . . . may be examined; and said lists shall remain 
open for examination for the space of fifteen days after notice shall have been given . . . .”  Act of July 
1, 1862, 12 Stat. 432, 437.  From that time until the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the confidentiality of tax 
returns was subject to the prevailing winds of political and administrative forces and sentiments.  For a 
detailed chronology of the tax return confidentiality practices and theories in force prior to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, see S. Doc. 94-266 at 821-1135 (1975). 
 91. 143 Cong. Rec. E693 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Paxon). 
 92. I.R.C. §§ 7213(a)(2), 7213A and 7431 (enacted under the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 
1997, P.L. 105-35 (Aug. 5, 1997) 110 Stat. 1104). 
 93. See e.g. Dixon v. Commr., 316 F.3d 1041, 1046, opinion editorially corrected at 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4843 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the secret settlement deals made by IRS trial attorneys, to the 
detriment of approximately 1,300 taxpayers “amounted to a fraud on both the taxpayers and the Tax 
Court”); Siddiqui v. U.S., 359 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2004) (reciting illegal disclosure of personal 
tax information by IRS agent at retirement luncheon attended by approximately 100 people); Straight v. 
Commr., 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1457, 1466-1467 (1997) (imposing sanctions on IRS for admitted alteration of 
document, and lying about it, by IRS agent); Abernathy v. U.S., 150 B.R. 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); U.S. 
Gen. Acctg. Off., Tax Administration: IRS Inspection Service and Taxpayer Advocate Roles for Ensur-
ing that Taxpayers are Treated Properly, Pub. No.  T-GGD-98-63 (Feb. 5, 1998) (statement of Lynda 
D. Willis, Director, Tax Policy and Administration Issues, General Government Division).; 137 Cong. 
Rec. S11813 (Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of Sen. Symms) (“As the pressure on the IRS grows year after 
year to collect every last dollar due to the Treasury, the incidents of taxpayers abuse by the Service 
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tax administration agency such as the IRS, which by nature requires in its 
temperament some attributes of a bulldog in order to be effective,94 has an 
indubitable need for statutory, regulatory and judicial leashes.  Paradoxi-
cally, while such control mechanisms certainly serve to complicate the 
taxation process; not having such controls would also ultimately cause 
complications in the taxation process. 
C.  Bureaucratic Dysfunction 
The IRS is a bureaucracy, and it functions (and malfunctions) accord-
ingly.  Many reported incidents of dysfunction within the IRS occur be-
cause it is a bureaucracy, and not because its mission is taxation.  For ex-
ample, there can be significant problems for the taxpayer where the cogni-
zant bureaucrat, 95 such as an Appeals Officer, proposes a particular set-
tlement with the taxpayer but lacks the authority to bind the IRS in such a 
settlement,96 or when one office within the IRS refuses to give relevant in-
formation to another.97 Even a conceptually simple matter can cause difficul-
ties, as when a taxpayer timely delivers a payment or document to the IRS, 
but the cognizant bureaucrat does not actually receive it until after the filing 
or payment deadline.98   There are also reported incidents of the IRS and other 
taxation authorities losing or misplacing tax returns and other documents,99 
  
grow as well.”); 126 Cong. Rec. 14415 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Baucus) (“Numerous horror stories have 
been reported in Montana and elsewhere . . . Fear of the IRS is based . . . on its well-earned reputation for 
inconsistency and unpredictability”); U. S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Tax Administration: IRS Can Strengthen Its 
Efforts to See That Taxpayers Are Treated Properly, Pub. No. GAO/GGD-95-14 (Oct. 1994); see gener-
ally Shelley L. Davis, Unbridled Power 196 (HarperBusiness 1997). 
 94. See supra n. 77 and accompanying text. 
 95. The author, a former IRS bureaucrat, imputes no negative or disparaging connotations to the 
word “bureaucrat” or to public sector career choices. 
 96. See e.g. Est. of Jones v. Commr., 795 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1986); David v. Commr., 66 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1774 (1993), aff’d, 43 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 97. Berg v. Commr., 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2004 (1993) (finding that IRS did not mail the notice of 
deficiency to taxpayer’s last known address where Special Agent in IRS Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion knew taxpayer’s latest address, but refused to divulge same to Examination Division).  
 98. See e.g. Hull v. U.S., 146 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1998) (ruling that receipt in the mailroom 
constitutes filing, regardless of the date the document is actually delivered to the cognizant IRS bureau-
crat); U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Multiple Collection Notices Sent to Individual Taxpayers, Pub. No. 
GAO/GGD-00-55, 5 (Apr. 2000) (describing delays in recording a tax payment after receipt as one 
cause of multiple collection notices being sent to taxpayers). 
 99. Andrew Crispo Gallery, Inc. v. Commr., 16 F.3d 1336, 1339 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that IRS lost 
evidence, thereby prejudicing taxpayer); In re Ashe, 228 B.R. 457 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“the IRS destroyed 
the file because the two year mandatory retention period had expired. Nor could IRS Appeals Officer 
Lee recall any dealings, conversations, or correspondence with Appellee about his case.”); Palihnich v. 
Commr., 86 T.C.M. 488 (CCH) (2003) (abating interest that accrued during the nearly 11 year period 
when the IRS Brookhaven Service Center lost the taxpayers’ tax returns); Cook v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 62, 
67 n. 5 (Fed. Cl. 2002), appeal dismissed, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17804 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Downing v. 
Commr., 118 T.C. 22 (2002); U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Tax Administration:  Information on IRS’ Phila-
delphia Service Center, Report B-221000 at 31-40 (Nov. 22, 1985) (reporting, inter alia, several sub-
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and losing track of tax payments tendered by taxpayers.100  While these types 
of incidents are not directly a function of any particular incomprehensible and 
verbose tax imposition statute, they nevertheless complicate the taxation 
process. 
1.   Incompatibility of the tax bureaucracy with the tax statutes it ad-
ministers 
Many of IRS’s bureaucratic dysfunctions directly result from incom-
patibility between the bureaucracy and the statute it administers.101  As an 
example, an Estate Tax return, filed at the IRS Service Center after its due 
date, is reviewed by a Service Center bureaucrat who, having inadequate 
expertise in Estate Tax matters, accepts the taxpayer’s explanation and 
waives the lateness penalties.  Later, after the return is sent to an IRS field 
office away from the Service Center, it again is reviewed by an Estate Tax 
Attorney who, being equipped with special expertise and training,102 finds 
the taxpayer’s explanation insufficient and reimposes the lateness penal-
ties.103 Were the bureaucracy better geared to Estate Tax returns, perhaps 
  
stantiated incidents of unprocessed tax returns and/or remittance checks being placed in trash recepta-
cles); see also Matter of Stephen Walter Kaminski, N.Y.L.J. 33, col. 5 (Jan. 22, 1996) (Surrog. Ct. 
Suffolk Co.) (noting that New York State Department of Taxation and Finance twice lost tax refund 
submission, thus necessitating a third submission of the paperwork). 
 100. E.g. Matter of Christian Lotterer, N.Y.S. Div. of Tax Appeals, Determination DTA No. 819042 
(Nov. 26, 2003) (available at http://www.nysdta.org/Determinations/819042.det.htm) (accessed May 
25, 2004) (rejecting denial by New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance that tax had been paid, in 
light of taxpayer’s canceled check drawn to New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, and 
entry of same in bank statement). 
 101. Cf. U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Tax Administration: Ways to Simplify the Estimated Tax Penalty 
Calculation, Pub. No. GAO/T-GGD-98-96, 11 (1998) (concurring in the IRS Commissioner’s position 
that Form 2210 should not be revised until recommended legislative action is implemented to amend the 
relevant statute). 
 102. See Sack v. Bentsen, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5714, n. 12 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding, inter alia, 
IRS practices calculated to recruit persons having “up-to-date knowledge of legal principles and agency 
practices” in Estate Tax Attorney positions); Collins v. Commr., 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 890 (1973) (noting 
that the IRS had at one point upgraded its employment qualifications to require a law degree for new 
hires for examination of Estate and Gift Tax returns); see also Bass v. Bragalini, 207 Misc. 1055, 1057, 
143 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1955) (noting specialized nature of Estate Tax Attorney 
position in the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance bureaucracy), aff’d, 286 App. Div. 
944, 143 N.Y.S.2d 494 (3d Dept. 1955), appeal denied 309 N.Y. 1032 (1955); Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, Estate and Gift Tax Law for Attorneys, Student Text Unit 1, ch. 1, Forward at page 1-1 (IRS Train-
ing Material 3129-22, TPDS 85576 (Jan. 1986)) (“You are about to embark on a career which deals with 
one of the most specialized areas of the tax law.”). 
 103. See e.g. Est. of Wilbanks v. Commr., 94 T.C. 306, 311-312 (1990) (“Wilbanks I”) (denying 
summary judgment to the taxpayer), reconsideration denied, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 896 (1990) (“Wilbanks 
II”), judgment on merits for respondent, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1779 (1991) (“Wilbanks III”), aff’d, 953 
F.2d 651 (11th Cir. 1992); Serv. Bolt & Nut Co. Trust v. Commr., 724 F.2d 519, 524-525 (6th Cir. 
1984); Reynolds v. Saadi, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10489 at *4 (Cal. App. 2003) (reciting fact 
that IRS reimposed previously abated late payment penalty on estate tax return); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9111005 
(Dec. 6, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-11-004 (Nov. 18, 1982). 
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by having a more specifically trained bureaucrat review the Estate Tax 
Return for lateness penalties at the Service Center in the first place, then 
the bureaucrat might have imposed the penalty initially, thus avoiding the 
bureaucratic flip-flop. 
The IRS’s bureaucracy has had significant compatibility problems with 
the statute that provides for the filing of joint personal income tax returns 
by married couples.104  Though there are two individual taxpayers involved 
in a joint income tax return filing, each with his or her own individual tax 
situation, the IRS bureaucracy treats each tax return as it would one indi-
vidual taxpayer. 
The standard procedure of the IRS is to use the social security 
number of the first taxpayer listed on a return as the means of 
tracking information about that return and that taxpayer in the IRS 
computer system.  Specifically, the standard procedure of the IRS 
is to use the social security number of the first taxpayer as the 
means for determining the last known address for a taxpayer that is 
available in the IRS computer system.  The social security number 
of the second taxpayer listed on a joint return is generally not used 
by the IRS for tracking purposes in its computer system.105 
In tracking only one “primary” taxpayer106 when there actually are two 
taxpayers who filed the return, the IRS can and does easily malfunction if 
the marriage disintegrates.  Refund checks have been issued to one ex (or 
soon-to-be ex) spouse when the income to which the refunded tax was at-
  
During the author’s service with the IRS as an Estate Tax Attorney, he had several occasions to reim-
pose lateness penalties that had previously been abated by another bureaucrat at the Service Center 
when the returns were initially filed.  The particulars of those cases are not matters of public record, 
accordingly, identification here of the taxpayers involved would be highly inappropriate.  See I.R.C. § 
7213(a)(1) (prohibiting, inter alia, former IRS employees from disclosing taxpayer information, under 
pain of $5,000 fine and/or 5 years imprisonment, together with costs of prosecution). 
 104. I.R.C. § 6013.  It is ironic that the joint spousal personal income tax return was initially intended 
to be a solution to another problem.  Prior to its institution, married couples residing in community 
property states could evenly split their income between the two spouses and take advantage of the 
lower tax brackets.  Accordingly, oil millionaires and other magnates in non-community property states 
such as Oklahoma were relocating to community property states such as Texas, causing political, social 
and economic turmoil. See Stern, supra n. 27, at 119-134. Moreover, the problems of a clueless 
spouse’s joint liability with his or (usually) her wrongdoing mate (or ex-mate) in tax matters have 
prompted Congress to enact a statutory protection for innocent spouses, I.R.C. § 6015, which has 
spawned its own complicated regulations and litigation. 
 105. U.S. v. Shafer, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5616, finding of fact no. 18 at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (cita-
tions to transcript omitted). 
 106. The first taxpayer listed on the joint income tax return, whose Social Security Number is used to 
track the return through the IRS bureaucracy, is often referred to as the “primary” taxpayer. See e.g. 
U.S. v. Nielsen, 1 F.3d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827 (1998) Wallin v. Commr., 
744 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1984). More often than not, the “primary” is the husband. 
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tributable was income of the other spouse or ex-spouse.107  Interest paid by 
the IRS has been reflected on the Form 1099 issued to the inappropriate 
spouse.108   
An IRS disclosure officer has admitted that disclosing whether a pro-
spective juror in a criminal tax trial has been the subject of an IRS tax au-
dit109 may be more difficult for the IRS by “a change of name and the fact 
that a prospective juror may have filed joint returns, while the records re-
flect the other spouse’s social security number as primary.”110  Yet, in an-
other criminal tax case, an IRS disclosure officer testified that it was “not 
necessary that the name and social security number of the potential juror’s 
spouse be provided in order for the IRS to accomplish a search of its re-
cords”111 [emphasis added].  Reconciling the two incidents, one can deduce 
that while it the IRS may have trouble tracking the tax history of a non-
primary spouse, the information nonetheless exists in its database and, 
through creative and diligent data searching techniques, it is possible to 
find the non-primary spouse information.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit found 
that 
[a] taxpayer’s social security number appears in only one of two 
locations on the tax return—in the primary taxpayer’s box or in the 
spousal taxpayer’s box . . . . The IRS has the ability to perform a 
computer search of both sets of social security numbers in order to 
discover a subsequent return filed under a different name or in a 
different state.112 
The IRS’s collection system, “keyed exclusively to the name and So-
cial Security number of the spouse who appears first on the joint return,”113 
has gotten the IRS into trouble for violating the automatic stay in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding114 by levying a debtor’s wages.115  And the bureaucracy 
is so fixated with the Social Security Numbers (“primary” or otherwise) 
that the IRS lost a Tax Court case in which it argued that a custodial par-
  
 107. U.S. v. MacPhail, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11545 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Hathaway v. U.S., 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5791 (W.D. Wash. 1993); Williamson v. U.S., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450 (D.N.J. 
1979). 
 108. Grimland v. Commr., 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 402 (1993). 
 109. I.R.C. § 6103(h)(5) formerly required that the IRS disclose whether a prospective juror in, inter 
alia,  a criminal tax trial has been the subject of an IRS tax audit.  That provision has since been re-
pealed.  P.L. 105-34, § 1238, 111 Stat. 788, 1038 (Aug. 5, 1997).  
 110. U.S. v. Nielsen, 1 F.3d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827 (1994). 
 111. U.S. v. Howell, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10515 at *26 (D. Kans. 1996). 
 112. Wallin v. Commr., 744 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 113. In re Washington, 172 B.R. 415, 419 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994). 
 114. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000). 
 115. In re Washington, 172 B.R. at 418. 
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ent’s written declaration releasing a claim to a dependency exemption 116 
must have the Social Security Numbers of both parents.117 
2.   Transactions between bureaucracies 
Bureaucratic dysfunction can also occur when two bureaucracies inter-
face with one another.  One bureaucracy with which the IRS has signifi-
cant interface is the United States Postal Service, a bureaucracy that cer-
tainly is not immune to dysfunction.  Postmarks applied by the Postal Ser-
vice are relevant and often critical to facilitating a taxpayer’s compliance 
with the tax laws,118 but the Postal Service has applied illegible postmarks 
to mailpieces,119 postmarks printed partially off the mailpiece,120 and have 
delivered mailpieces with no postmark at all.121  A postmaster has been 
known to change a taxpayer’s mailing address twice in a thirteen month 
period.122  Additionally, the detinue of mail to the IRS by the Postal Ser-
vice has caused “potentially serious ramifications” for some taxpayers.123 
In 1966, well before the Internet, Congress intended that the public 
would use the postal system to file tax returns and other documents with 
the IRS.124  Three decades later, as new technologies became reality, Con-
gress tasked the Treasury Department to develop a “return-free tax system” 
in which electronic filing became the norm.125  But if electronic tax filing 
simplifies the return filing by circumventing the Postal Service and its dys-
functions, it has also created a whole new administrative necessity, 
  
 116. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2). 
 117. Boltinghouse v. Commr., 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1277 (2003). 
 118. I.R.C. § 7502.  Proof of a postmark is further discussed infra at notes 187 through 197 and 
accompanying text. 
 119. See e.g. Skolski v. Commr., 351 F.2d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 1965); Berry v. Commr., 67 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 2983, 2983 (1994); Dorsey v. Commr., 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2474, 2476 (1993); Minuto v. 
Commr., 66 T.C. 616, 617 (1976); Augustin v. Gilot, 606 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (N.Y. App. Term. 1993); 
In re Joshua T., 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 553, n. 4 at *5 (Cal. App. 2001); Migliore v. Migliore, 
717 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. App. 1998). 
 120. See Selvaggi v. Dir. of Revenue, Delaware Tax App. Bd., Docket No. 952 (July 12, 1991). 
 121. See e.g. Fallen v. U.S., 378 U.S. 139 (1964); Casqueira v. Commr., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 656, 657 
(1981); Sylvan v. Commr., 65 T.C. 548 (1975); Higby v. Commr., T.C. 1973-176, (1973); Rappaport v. 
Commr., 55 T.C. 709, 710 (1971), aff’d, 456 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 122. Sicari v. Commr., 136 F.3d 925 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 123. See Arnold Abrams, A Taxing Situation; IRS Says Postal Service Held Up Its Mail, Newsday 
(Long Island, N.Y.) 2 (July 28, 1990) (reporting the IRS District Director’s protest that the Garden 
City, NY Post Office detained mail to the newly opened Garden City office of the IRS). 
 124. See e.g. Sen. Rpt. 89-1625 at 1-2 (1966) (reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3676, 3683-3684) 
(permitting Treasury Department to require tax returns to be mailed to service center). 
 125. Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 2001 et seq. (July 22, 1998).  The term “return-free tax system” is a 
misnomer, inasmuch as taxpayers will continue to be required to provide the Government a report of 
computations for the taxes owed.  A more accurate terminology for the Congressional ideal would be 
“paper-free tax return system.” 
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namely, developing and enforcing qualification criteria for those who are 
authorized to offer electronic filing services to the public.  Indeed, the IRS 
already has had occasion to suspend or exclude some vendors from its 
Electronic Filing Program.126 
It is clear, then, that tax simplification means more than removing the 
excess verbiage associated with conjunctive logical operators such as “if”, 
“and,” “or,” “subject to,” and “except as provided” from the taxation stat-
utes and regulations.127  There can be no real tax simplification if the bu-
reaucratic apparatus that administers the tax is not compatible and conso-
nant with the statutory taxation scheme, and with the other bureaucracies 
with which it must interface in administering the tax.  
D.  Administrative Discretion of the IRS 
1.   Discretion in collecting delinquent taxes 
Notwithstanding the dangers of reposing discretion in the tax collector 
as to the amount of the tax,128 it is necessary that individuals in the taxation 
bureaucracy have discretion in certain administrative matters.  Indeed, the 
much despised IRS tax audit is based upon the principle that the Secretary 
of the Treasury, able to personally accomplish only so much in a 24-hour 
day, has been given authority and discretion which, in turn, are delegated 
all the way down to the IRS agent in the field.129 
  
 126. Brenner Income Tax Ctrs., Inc. v. Dir. of Practice for the IRS, 87 F. Supp. 2d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (upholding IRS suspension from Electronic Filing Program of a tax preparer); Forehand v. IRS, 
877 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Ala.1995) (same); Ekanem v. IRS, 98-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,257, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2866 (D. Md.1998) (same); Sabat v. IRS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3974; 200-1 U.S.T.C. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,328 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (same); Compro-Tax, Inc. v. IRS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8155, 2000-
1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,406 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d, 273 F.3d 1095; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22621 (5th 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1053 (2002) (same). 
 127. The author’s keyword LEXIS search of the Internal Revenue Code for the phrase “except as 
provided” yielded 624 hits (Jan. 12, 2004). 
 128. See epigraph to this article, supra n. 1 and accompanying text. 
 129. I.R.C. § 7601(a):  
 
The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees 
of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal reve-
nue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to 
pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and manage-
ment of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed. Id. 
 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7601-1: 
 
Each district director shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or em-
ployees under his supervision and control to proceed, from time to time, through his 
district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay 
 
File: ryesky(macro) Created on:  6/28/2004 5:54:00 PM Last Printed: 6/30/2004 7:50:00 AM 
116 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 2, No. 2 
The federal budget’s revenue is largely comprised of the all-too-
familiar paycheck deductions that employers collect from America’s work-
force and, in turn, remit to the IRS.130  In the event that the employer fails 
to remit such funds to the IRS, I.R.C. § 6672 provides that all persons who 
were responsible for collecting, accounting for, and paying over the “trust 
funds”131 are liable for the amount of the taxes due,132 and that liability is 
joint and several.133 
The IRS has broad discretion as to which responsible party it may pur-
sue, 134 and often directs its efforts without regard to relative degree of re-
sponsibility.135  Thus, where even the most egregiously responsible person 
has disappeared or is insolvent, the IRS can and does go after the party 
who, like the low-hanging fruit in the orchard, is most conveniently avail-
able. 136 The broad collection discretion provided to the IRS through I.R.C. 
§ 6672 often yields inequitable results, akin to forcing “a cabin boy on a 
sinking ship” to “follow it to the bottom of the sea while the admiral was 
  
any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management 
of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed. Id. 
 
 130. See I.R.C. §§ 3401 et seq.  One seldom discussed administrative consideration behind requiring 
employers to withhold income taxes from employees’ pay, and in requiring merchants to add sales 
taxes to customer purchases, is that it keeps the government’s taxation personnel out of the direct line 
of fire (often literally) from hostile and unwilling employees, customers, or other such unenthusiastic 
taxpayers.  See e.g. Elizabeth Mehren, Massachusetts Man Convicted of Office Massacre, L.A. Times 
A1 (Apr. 25, 2002) (describing a workplace massacre that was the result of a tax withholding dispute 
between employer and the defendant employee); Michael Cooper, Suspect Is Arrested in Threat to 
Store That Was Set Ablaze, N.Y. Times B3 (Apr. 28, 1998) (reporting alleged threat to burn down 
store, made by firebombing suspect, in course of dispute with store owner over sales tax on purchase of 
a hat). 
 131. Taxes held by employers (and others) for the government are commonly known as “trust funds.” 
See e.g. Slodov v. U.S., 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978); Fran Corp. v. U.S., 164 F.3d 814, 817 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
 132. I.R.C. § 6672.  For more detailed discussions regarding parties who may be responsible under 
I.R.C. § 6672, see Corrie Lynn Lyle, The Wrath of I.R.C. § 6672: The Renewed Call for Change – Is 
Anyone Listening?  If You Are a Corporate Official, You had Better Be, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133, 1140 - 
1143 (2001); Mary A. Bedikian, The Pernicious Reach of 26 U.S.C. § 6672, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 225 
(1993).  Many states and localities have provisions similar if not verbatim to I.R.C. § 6672. E.g. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 12-736; Minn. Stat. § 270.101; NY Tax Law § 685(g); see also N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 
T46-65.0 (g) and U46-35.0 (g). 
 133. See e.g. Thosteson v. U.S., 304 F.3d 1312, 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002), aff’g, 182 F. Supp. 2d 
1189 (M.D. Ala. 2001). 
 134. U.S. v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1980); Kelly v. Lethert, 362 F.2d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 
1966); Hornsby v. U.S., 588 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Abramson v. U.S., 39 B.R. 237, 
239 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 1984). 
 135. Howard v. U.S., 711 F.2d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 1983) (“And section 6672(a) looks only to ’respon-
sible persons,’ not to ’the most responsible person,’ for satisfaction.”). 
 136. See e.g. Thosteson, supra, n. 133, at 1315; Grizaffi v. U.S., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6951 (N.D. 
Ill. 1987); Unger v. U.S., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10932, 84 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6817 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), 
on remand from U.S. v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999). 
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picked up by helicopter and safely put ashore.”137  In one situation, the 
“cabin boy,” Nathan Unger, “was twenty-eight years old when the tax de-
linquency occurred. Since then he has been stripped of all his assets (in-
cluding a life insurance policy) and is faced with an undischargable debt of 
more than one million dollars.”138 
To partially remedy the inequities of the IRS’s administration of § 
6672, Congress included, as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, a federal 
statutory right of contribution in favor of responsible persons who actually 
pay more than their proportionate share of trust fund penalties.139  But a 
right of contribution is of limited value unless the persons against whom 
the right may be asserted are known, so Congress also had to amend its 
disclosure statute, I.R.C. § 6103, to enable persons pursued by the IRS to 
know the identity of, and collection efforts made against, other persons 
responsible for the same funds.140  Thus, the discretion of the IRS to collect 
trust fund taxes from any available source has had a complicating effect 
upon the taxation system, and beyond. 
The IRS also has the discretion to allocate payments from the taxpayer 
where the taxpayer has outstanding obligations to the IRS arising from 
more than one tax year or type of tax.  A taxpayer may direct the allocation 
  
 137. Unger v. U.S., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 138. Unger v. U.S., 956 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  The Unger litigation would wend its 
way through the courts for many years, and included a remand after denial of certiorari by the United 
States Supreme Court on one issue; see Unger v. U.S., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10932, 84 A.F.T.R.2d 
(RIA) 6817 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), on remand from U.S. v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
526 U.S. 1130 (1999).  Mr. Unger’s “cabin boy” position would also oblige him to the New York State 
Department of Taxation and Finance for trust fund penalties with respect to unremitted sales taxes. 
Matter of Unger, N.Y.S. Tax App. Tribunal, DTA Nos. 805351 and 805353 (Mar. 24, 1994) ( available 
at http://www.nysdta.org/Decisions/805351.dec.pdf) (accessed May 25, 2004). 
 139. I.R.C. § 6672(d) (enacted under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 903, 110 
Stat. 1452, 1466 (1996). 
 140. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(9) (enacted under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 902, 
110 Stat. 1452, 1466 (1996). 
The new subsection reads: 
 
(9) Disclosure of certain information where more than one person subject to penalty 
under section 6672. -- If the Secretary determines that a person is liable for a penalty 
under section 6672(a) with respect to any failure, upon request in writing of such per-
son, the Secretary shall disclose in writing to such person-- 
(A) the name of any other person whom the Secretary has determined to be liable for 
such penalty with respect to such failure, and 
(B) whether the Secretary has attempted to collect such penalty from such other per-
son, the general nature of such collection activities, and the amount collected. Id.   
 
TBOR2 also made other amendments to I.R.C. § 6672, largely irrelevant to the discussion in this Arti-
cle, relating to preliminary notice requirements and to immunity for voluntary board members of tax-
exempt organizations.  TBOR2 § 901, 110 Stat. 1452, 1465-1466 (codified at I.R.C. § 6672(b)) & 
TBOR2 § 904, 110 Stat. 1452, 1467 (codified at I.R.C. § 6672(e)). 
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of payments made voluntarily, but the IRS has broad discretion to apply 
involuntary payments, or voluntary remittances without specific taxpayer 
directions, to such outstanding taxpayer obligations as the IRS deems ap-
propriate.141  Thus, one party responsible for “trust fund” penalties142 can 
benefit or lose, depending upon whether the IRS allocates the payments 
made by another responsible party with respect to the same underlying 
taxes.143  Additionally, IRS bureaucrats are given relatively broad discre-
tion to enter into closing agreements with taxpayers,144 compromise in civil 
or criminal liability of the taxpayer145 and pay “snitch” bounties to infor-
mants who apprise the IRS of tax law violations by others.146  
2.   Discretion in applying and interpreting the tax statutes 
Some administrative discretion most certainly facilitates the orderly 
function of the taxation system, but such breadth of discretionary powers 
can complicate taxes to the extent that similarly situated taxpayers are 
treated differently.  The courts more strictly scrutinize decisions of admin-
istrative agencies where the agencies have inconsistently applied the stat-
utes and their own regulations.147  Thus, appeals of agency decisions not 
rooted in consistency are more uncertain, which, in the case of the IRS, 
does little to impart tax simplicity.   
Private IRS rulings for particular taxpayers give the IRS great latitude 
to duck its duty to accord similar treatments to taxpayers in similar pre-
dicaments.  Private rulings have no precedential value, and the IRS thus 
has no obligation to follow them with subsequent, similarly situated tax-
payers.148  They are now available to the public, albeit sanitized of specific 
  
 141. See e.g. Rev. Proc. 2002-26, 2002-1 C.B. 746; Muntwyler v. U.S., 703 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 
1983); Liddon v. U.S., 448 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972). 
 142. See supra nn. 131-138 and accompanying text. 
 143. See e.g. In re Energy Resources Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. U.S. 
v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).  Suppose, for example, that certain third parties 
that included “responsible” individuals were willing to advance enough money to rehabilitate the 
corporation only if the court would assure them that the reorganized corporation would pay its “trust 
fund” tax debts first.  That assurance would diminish the likelihood that the third parties would have to 
pay the debts personally; without it they might prefer immediate liquidation, which could mean total 
payment of all tax debt, and “a guarantee that no tax penalty will be assessed against them personally 
[internal citations omitted].” Id. 
 144. I.R.C. § 7121. 
 145. I.R.C. § 7122; Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1. 
 146. See e.g. Carelli v IRS, 668 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1982); Schein v U.S. (E.D.N.Y. 1972) 352 F. Supp. 
182 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 147. See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). 
 148. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3). 
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identifying information,149 thanks to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.150  Prior 
to 1976, the IRS took zealous measures to resist disclosing its private rul-
ings.151 
The Sklar case152 demonstrates how the IRS’s inconsistent application 
of the allowability of charitable deductions for payments of tuition for reli-
gious education has led to uncertainty, litigation and complication.  In 
Sklar, taxpayers allocated the tuition payments made to the religious pri-
vate school in which their children were enrolled, and claimed a charitable 
deduction on their 1994 personal income tax return for the portion allo-
cated to religious studies.153  The IRS had allowed similar expenses with 
respect to the Church of Scientology,154 and had in fact “obsoleted” a pre-
vious revenue ruling specifically determining that such deductions for 
Church of Scientology “audits” were not deductible.155  Though critical of 
the IRS’s special treatment of the Church of Scientology, the court held 
that the Sklars could not claim the deduction.156  In a concurring opinion, 
Judge Silverman wrote: 
If the IRS does, in fact, give preferential treatment to members of 
the Church of Scientology—allowing them a special right to claim 
deductions that are contrary to law and rightly disallowed to eve-
rybody else—then the proper course of action is a lawsuit to stop 
to that policy. The remedy is not to require the IRS to let others 
claim the improper deduction, too.157 
Well-wishers, many of whom foot the bill for private religious day 
school tuition, from diverse religious backgrounds were quite disappointed 
by the ruling against the Sklars.158  The Sklars have resumed litigation 
  
 149. I.R.C. § 6110(c). 
 150. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1201(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 6110).  
 151. See e.g. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Fruehauf 
Corp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 1085 (1977).  The 
Supreme Court vacated Fruehauf subsequent to the Circuit Court’s ruling to require disclosure based 
on 1976 legislation that added I.R.C. § 6110 to open private letter rulings and other written IRS deter-
minations to public inspection.  IRS v. Fruehauf Corp., 429 U.S. 1085 (1977). 
 152. See Sklar v. Commr., 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’g, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1815 (2000)). 
 153. Id. at 612. 
 154. The IRS refused to disclose the details of its closing agreement with the Church of Scientology 
to the taxpayer, the Department of Justice, or the Court, claiming that it was confidential, and thus the 
court assumed that they had allowed the deductions. Id. at 614.  Nevertheless, purported copies of the 
agreement had been published in unofficial sources. See e.g. Scientologists and IRS Settle for $ 12.5 
Million, Wall St. J. A12 (Dec. 30, 1997). 
 155. Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75 (obsoleting Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68). 
 156. Sklar, 282 F.3d at 619, 622. 
 157. Id. at 623. 
 158. See e.g. Agudath Israel of America, Press Release, Feb. 1, 2002 (available at 
http://www.jlaw.com/Recent/religtuition.html) (accessed May 25, 2004); see also Christianity Today 
magazine, Weblog,  (week of Aug. 21, 2000) (available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/ 
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against the IRS on the same issue, with respect to their 1995 tax year. 159     
Sklar illustrates how secrecies and inconsistencies in the IRS’s use and 
abuse of its broad discretion have complicated taxes in America. 
V.  MULTIPLE TAXATION AUTHORITIES 
This article does not strive to set forth any detailed analysis of the in-
terplay that occurs when an event or transaction is subject to the taxes im-
posed by multiple authorities.  Such interplay, however, works contrary to 
tax simplification. 
In an effort to simplify tax returns, many states conform their income 
tax schemes to the federal scheme.160  Such coordination has simplified the 
lives of taxpayers who, already burdened with the distasteful task of pre-
paring their federal income tax returns, can realize economies of labor in 
  
2000/134/32.0.html (accessed May 25, 2004) (“[The Sklar] case will be an interesting one to watch.”)).  
The Agudath Israel of America, a religious Jewish organization, filed a brief amicus curiae in support 
of the Sklars in their appeal to the 9th Circuit. 
 159. David Cay Johnston, Scientologists’ Tax Break Cited in Suit Against I.R.S., N.Y. Times C-6, col. 
5 (Mar. 24, 2004).  Serious questions persist as to whether the Sklars are the ideal taxpayers to bring a 
test case against the IRS on the issue.  Michael Sklar is a Certified Public Accountant who prepares 
personal income tax returns of others.  See Michael Sklar, Homepage of Michael Sklar, an Accountancy 
Corporation, http://pages.prodigy.com/netcpa (accessed May 25, 2004).  Sklar filed his own 1994 
personal income tax return late, even after two extensions of time were granted, tendering the excuse 
“that he was simply too busy to file his Federal income tax return for 1994 by October 15, 1995.”  
Sklar, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1815 at 1817, aff’d, 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002).  Just as IRS agents are held 
to a higher standard by the IRS and the courts to comply with their tax obligations, see supra notes 87 
and 88 and accompanying text, so, too, do the IRS and the courts have special heightened expectations 
that accountants and others who prepare the tax returns for the public file their own returns in a timely 
manner and otherwise comply with the tax laws.  See e.g. Blocker v. Commr., 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1586 
(1992), aff’d, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. 1994); Keene v. Commr., 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1335 (1982), aff’d, 
734 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1984); Dustin v. Commr., 53 T.C. 491, 507 (1969), aff’d, 467 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 
1972); see also U.S. v. Fritzson, 979 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming upward adjustment of offense 
level due to defendant’s use of his special skills as accountant to perpetuate a fraud upon the IRS); 
Director, Off. Prof. Resp. v. Banister, Complaint No. 2003-2, Dept. of Treasury (Dec. 29, 2003) (avail-
able at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/banister.pdf (accessed May 25, 2004)) (disbarring respondent 
from practicing before IRS, and finding respondent’s status as a C.P.A. and past position as an IRS 
agent to be aggravating factors). 
Sklar’s lateness may well have placed him and his wife at a disadvantage against the system’s inherent 
biases against untimely tax return filers. 
 160. See e.g. 72 P.S. § 7330(a) (synchronizing the filing due date of the Pennsylvania personal in-
come tax return with the due date for the federal return); Cal Rev & Tax Code § 17008.5 (2004) (apply-
ing the I.R.C. § 7704 provisions treating publicly traded partnerships as corporations under California 
tax law); Ohio Code § 5747.01 (2003) (providing that with respect to Ohio state income taxes, 
“[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided or clearly appearing from the context, any term used in this 
chapter has the same meaning as when used in a comparable context in the Internal Revenue Code”). 
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contemporaneously preparing and filing their state (and sometimes local) 
income tax returns using much of the same basic information.161   
But when state statutes make adjustments to the federal numbers for 
state tax purposes, the process gets more complicated.  For example, 
though New York generally follows the federal scheme for income,162 it 
departs from it in several respects, including its treatment of interest in-
come on state and local bonds issued by non-New York State entities.163  
Taxpayers thus need to make the appropriate calculations to the federal 
income entries to adjust them for the New York State Income Tax re-
turn.164 
State tax authorities also complicate the administration of taxes when 
they apply different standards to the process than the IRS.  For example, a 
state may impose a lateness penalty on a tardy state income tax return even 
when the IRS has waived the analogous federal penalty.165  Indeed, to rebut 
the IRS’s presumably correct findings, the taxpayer need only prove the 
tax auditor’s findings incorrect by a preponderance of evidence,166 but is 
held to the more stringent “clear and convincing evidence” standard when 
the same records are examined by the New York State Department of taxa-
tion and finance.167  And the standards to which the New York City tax-
payer is held are not necessarily the same as those imposed for analogous 
taxes at the state level.168 
The I.R.C. § 2011 credit for state death taxes illustrates another com-
plicating interplay between federal and state tax administration. Subject to 
a graduated table of limitations, when I.R.C. § 2011 was in full effect,169 it 
  
 161. Cf. Adam Smith, supra n. 1 (“[Maxim number] III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in 
the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.”).  Most if not all of 
the commercially available tax return preparation software have provisions for generating both federal 
and state income tax returns. See e.g. Bruce V. Bigelow, It May not be April, but it’s Quite Taxing, San 
Diego Union-Tribune C-1 (Dec. 2, 2003) (“In addition to the federal tax software, Intuit has developed 
different TurboTax versions for filing individual returns in 45 states.”). 
 162. N.Y. CLS Tax § 612 (2003). 
 163. N.Y. CLS Tax § 612(b)(2) (2003). 
 164. N.Y. State Dept. of Taxation & Finance, Form 201 Resident Income Tax Return (2003), Line 
19. 
 165. See e.g. Hallmac Walls & Ceilings, Inc. v. St. of Wash., Dkt. No. 46828-24 (Wash. St. Bd. of 
Tax App. 1995), http://bta.state.wa.us/search.htm (accessed May 25, 2004). 
 166. Brewster v. Commr., 607 F.2d 1369, 1374-1375 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 167. Blodnick v. N.Y. State Tax Commn., 124 A.D.2d 437, 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1986), 
appeal withdrawn 514 N.E.2d 1375 (1987). 
 168. Carolyn J. Lee & Joseph Lipari, Tax Departments, Tribunals Differ on Combined Reporting 
Cases, 231 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 1 (Mar. 5, 2004) (discussing inconsistent authorities used by New York 
State Tax Appeals Tribunal and New York City Tax Appeals Tribunal). 
 169. The state death tax credit will not be available to the estates of decedents dying after December 
31, 2004. I.R.C. § 2011(f).  This article will not detail the complexities and uncertainties associated 
with the possibly temporary phaseout/repeal of the federal estate tax as provided by the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (“EGTRRA”) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38. 
Suffice it to say that EGTRRA itself has contributed nothing at all towards the cause of tax simplifica-
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allowed estates a dollar for dollar credit against the federal estate tax for 
taxes paid to states by reason of the decedent’s death.  “The state death tax 
credit was designed to preserve for states an historic source of revenue 
without incurring additional expense to their citizens.”170 
Many states simply fixed their death taxes at the I.R.C. § 2011 credit 
amount.171  Such a tax is sometimes referred to as a “sponge tax” because it 
absorbs, for the state treasury, funds which otherwise would go to the 
IRS.172  Where the state death tax exceeds the I.R.C. § 2011 credit amount, 
however, the state can no longer merely require the estate representative to 
inform the state taxation authority of any federal audit changes in the fed-
eral tax (and therefore the state tax), but must independently  audit estate 
tax returns.  Moreover, the additional state death taxes over and above the 
I.R.C. § 2011 credit pass to the state and not to a decedent’s spouse of a 
charity (?); accordingly, the amount of the additional tax does not qualify 
for a federal marital or charitable deduction.173 
Where a taxpayer relocates from one state to another during the year, 
or otherwise is not a full year resident of any one state, the taxpayer may 
have multiple state and/or local tax obligations in addition to the federal.  
The situation is all the more complex if the taxpayer or the transactions go 
international.  Increased mobility of people and goods, together with its 
consequent expansion of businesses into or between multiple jurisdictions, 
can only complicate the taxes.174 
It is clear, then, that merely overhauling the Internal Revenue Code is 
not going to win the battle to simplify America’s taxes.  The state and local 
tax statutes, and the taxation authorities that enforce those statutes, must 
also be given their due regard if not actually included in the effort. 
  
tion. See generally, Karen C. Burke & Grayson M. P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: Through the 
Looking Glass, 22 Va. Tax Rev. 187 (2002).   
 170. Second Natl. Bank of New Haven v. U.S., 297 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (D. Conn. 1969). 
 171. E.g. 36 M.R.S. § 4063 (2003) (Maine tax on estate of resident); Idaho Code § 14-403 (2003) 
(same, Idaho). 
 172. See e.g. Sara R. Stadler, A Cure for the Creeping Palm Tree Disease, Conn. L. Tribune S4 (Feb. 
12, 1996) (referring to Florida’s tax, equal to the I.R.C. § 2011, as a “sponge tax”); see also Joshua S. 
Rubenstein & Eileen Caulfield Schwab, Historic New York Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 218 N.Y.L.J. 1 
(Aug. 20, 1997) (referring to such tax as a “sop tax”). 
 173. Chiles v. U.S., 843 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 174. See e.g. Tom Herman, Tax Report:  A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax 
Developments, Wall St. J. 1 (Sept. 29, 1999) (reporting that AT&T must file an estimated 39,912 state 
and local tax returns each year); Alaska Dept. of Revenue v. Dyncorp & Subsidiaries, 14 P.3d 981, 983 
(Alaska 2000) (reciting that Dyncorp was required to file over 300 amended state tax returns on ac-
count of its business activities in most states). 
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VI. JUDICIARY’S TREATMENT OF TAX CASES 
A.   The Unreported Opinion Controversy 
One great burning controversy among the bench and bar is the limita-
tion, in many jurisdictions, of the precedential value of unreported judicial 
opinions.175  “[U]nder a regime in which judges may choose ex ante 
whether to publish decisions, judges might bury hard questions in unpub-
lished decisions. Judges might also seek to deviate from precedent in un-
published decisions, knowing that an unpublished decision will not draw as 
much attention as a published decision.”176  One appellate judge reportedly 
acknowledged the bar’s “legitimate concern” that unreported opinions can be 
an abusive means for “sweeping tough decisions under the rug.”177 
Combined with the notoriously arcane complexity of American taxa-
tion, unreported opinions have had some curious effects upon the devel-
opment and administration of American tax law.  Generalist judges, often 
relatively unfamiliar with the particulars of the tax statutes and regulations, 
can be tempted to deliver an unreported opinion as a means of limiting the 
precedential value of, and therefore the potential damage and fallout from, 
a questionably reasoned decision.178  Judge Patricia Wald, a Chief Judge of 
the U. S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit before moving 
on to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,179 has 
noted that “[t]here is always risk in generalist judges construing the intricate 
interrelationships of words and phrases in specialized legislation, and that 
danger is heightened in the case of the Internal Revenue Code.”180  Judge 
  
 175. See e.g. Anastasoff v. U. S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc & remanded, 235 
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); Developments and Practice Notes: Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and 
“No-Citation” Rules, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 169 (2001) (Mini-Symposium);  Memo. from Hon. 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of Advisory Committee on Appellate 
Rules 30-39 (May 22, 2003) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ Reports/AP5-2003.pdf (ac-
cessed May 25, 2004); Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion; Should Judges Make More Rulings Avail-
able as Precedent? How an Obscure Proposal is Dividing the Federal Bench, Legal Times 1 (Apr. 12, 
2004). 
 176. RECENT CASES: Constitutional Law – Article III Judicial Power - Eighth Circuit Holds That 
Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded Precedential Effect, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 945 (2001).   
 177. Edward A. Adams, Increased Use of Unpublished Rulings Faulted, 212 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Aug. 2, 
1994) (quoting Second Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg). 
 178. See supra nn.176-177 and accompanying text; cf. John J. Tigue, Jr. & Jeremy H. Temkin, Sec-
ond Circuit Tax Cases in 2003, 231 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Jan. 15, 2004) (“All of these [tax law] decisions were 
issued in the form of summary orders, signaling some reluctance on the court’s part to imbue them with 
application beyond the case at hand.”). 
 179. Federal Judges Biographical Database, Patricia McGowan Wald, http://air.fjc.gov/servlet/ tGet-
Info?jid=2475 (accessed May 25, 2004). 
 180. Ryan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 644, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., 
dissenting). 
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Richard A. Posner, an accomplished academician and prolific author on legal, 
monetary and economic issues,181 has opined that in technical areas of the tax 
laws, “we generalist judges should be loath to lay down the law on the ques-
tion without the Treasury’s view.”182  If jurists in the league of Posner or 
Wald tread with caution in adjudicating tax cases, then many judges of lesser 
caliber, reluctant to second-guess the IRS, are surely tempted to seek refuge 
in the unreported opinion when confronted with the task of applying the tax 
statutes. 
Carrying the caution of such refugee a step further, a judge who is un-
sure of the tax laws may take the path of least resistance in a tax litigation 
situation by giving too much deference to the tax collector’s views of the 
law, which can hardly be called objective.183  Moreover, by keeping dis-
proportionately large numbers of taxation opinions out of the mainstream, 
judges fail to facilitate the development of bodies of case law on the vari-
ous sections of the Internal Revenue Code.  As Justice Douglas has la-
mented, the United States Supreme Court seems “particularly ill-equipped 
to resolve income tax disputes between the Commissioner and the taxpay-
ers [because it] . . . seldom see[s] enough of them to develop any expertise 
in the area.”184  Collectively and synergistically, the judiciary impacts the 
system by failing to objectively police the IRS or effectively create viable 
tax law precedent. 
B.  Unreported Opinions and I.R.C. § 7502 
Judge Arnold’s ruling in Anastasoff 185 has touched off renewed and in-
tensified debate and interest in the unreported opinion controversy.186  
Though Anastasoff will likely be remembered for its considerable contribu-
  
 181. See Judge Richard A. Posner Brief Biographical Sketch, http://home.uchicago.edu/~rposner/ 
biography (accessed May 25, 2004). 
 182. Rebecca K. Crown Income Charitable Fund v. Commr., 8 F.3d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 183. See e.g. Lykes v. U.S., 343 U.S. 118, 128-129 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The Treasury 
may feel that it is good public policy to discourage taxpayers from contesting its unjustified demands 
for taxes and thus justify penalizing resistance.  It is hard to imagine any instance in which the Treasury 
could have a stronger self-interest in its regulation.”).  Justice Jackson’s accomplished career included, 
prior to his ascension to the Supreme Court bench, a stint as General Counsel of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue.  Federal Judges Biographical Database, Robert Houghwout Jackson, http://air.fjc.gov/serv-
let/tGetInfo?jid=1160 (accessed May 25, 2004). 
 184. Commr. v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J, dissenting). 
 185. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th 
Cir. 2000). 
 186. See e.g. Developments and Practice Notes: Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and “No-
Citation” Rules, supra, n. 175; Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process 
Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 695 
(2001); John P. Borger & Chad M. Oldfather, Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate over Unpub-
lished Opinions, 36 Tort & Ins. L.J. 899 (2001); Bruce M. Wexler & F. Christopher Mizzo, Unpub-
lished Opinions Rising, But Do They Help?, 227 N.Y.L.J. S8 (Feb. 11,2002). 
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tion to the unpublished opinion controversy, it was a tax case; specifically, 
a case about the timely postmark rule under §7502 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.187 There is split authority among the Circuits in connection with I.R.C. 
§ 7502.188 As this author has previously observed,  
Consistent with its institutional bias to maximize tax assessments, 
the IRS, whenever possible, routinely takes the position that where 
the IRS does not note an actual postmark on the envelope, I.R.C. § 
7502 only allows a taxpayer to prove a timely mailing by produc-
ing a receipt for registered or certified mail.  Because federal taxa-
tion is such a complex, specialized, and esoteric area of the law, 
even the most learned judges have conceded difficulty in interpret-
ing the taxation statutes.  Therefore, the judiciary often finds 
adopting the IRS’s position inherently simpler than overruling it. 
Under such circumstances, the IRS has throughout the years per-
suaded various courts to accept its interpretation of I.R.C. § 7502, 
creating, in effect, a “Big Lie” that Congress specifically intended 
to limit proof of a postmark to registered or certified mailings.  
Courts in circuits where the “Big Lie” has been accepted as truth 
now blindly follow circuit precedent and, indeed, with robotic pre-
dictability, go to great lengths to negate, deny and disregard any 
interpretation inconsistent with the IRS’s position under section 
7502.189 
I.R.C. § 7502 is, at best, ambiguous as to whether a mailing via regis-
tered or certified mail is the sole means to prove a postmark on a tax return 
or other mailing to the IRS or to the Tax Court.  The split among the Cir-
cuits on that issue is evidence of that ambiguity.  Taxation statutes are to be 
strictly and narrowly construed, and “[i]n case of doubt they are construed 
most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.”190  The 
legislative history of I.R.C. § 7502 is totally devoid of any language to indi-
cate that Congress intended a registered or certified mailing to be the ex-
clusive means of proving a postmark.191  Indeed, the House and Senate 
Reports specifically state with respect to an amendment to I.R.C. § 7502 
that “[t]he taxpayer, of course, could also establish the date of mailing by 
  
 187. I.R.C. § 7502; Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899. 
 188. Compare e.g. Surowka v. U.S., 909 F.2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1990) (disallowing evidence other 
than an official postal receipt to prove a postmark) with Est. of Wood v. Commr., 909 F.2d 1155, 1161-
1162 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing other extrinsic evidence). 
 189. Kenneth H. Ryesky, Analysis of the Split Authority on Proof of a Postmark under Internal Reve-
nue Code § 7502, 21 U. Dayton L. Rev. 379, 395-396 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 190. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. U.S., 988 F.2d 1135, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Gould 
v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917)). 
 191. See Wood, 909 F.2d at 1160. 
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other competent evidence [besides registered or certified mail receipts].”192  
Yet, in some Circuits, a judiciary intimidated by the Internal Revenue 
Code has abdicated its responsibility to prevent excesses on the part of the 
tax collector by blindly accepting the IRS party line, even though the IRS 
position flies in the face of explicit Congressional sentiment.193 
Had the judiciary done its job, the IRS would be required to live by the 
provisions of I.R.C. § 7502, and by its own duly promulgated regulations.  
The IRS may well have the authority to prescribe, by regulation that the 
sole means of proving a postmark under I.R.C. § 7502 is by proof of a reg-
istered or certified mailing.  The Federal Acquisitions Regulations had 
contained just such a provision (and indeed a more stringent one) to prove 
the timely mailing of a bid for a Federal procurement contract.194  A Fed-
eral agency can thus be strict in its application of the statutes it must en-
force, provided that it properly promulgates clear and explicit rules. 
The IRS, however, has revised neither its own regulations nor its offi-
cial instructions for its tax forms to explicitly limit the proof of a timely 
postmark to a registered or certified mailing.  On the contrary, the IRS 
continues to successfully assert its “Big Lie” in most of the Federal Cir-
cuits,195 where the judiciary, having swallowed, hook, line and sinker, the 
IRS’s questionable interpretation of I.R.C. § 7502, lacks the will to depart 
from its own faulty rationale to contradict the tax collector.   
The Federal judiciary has failed to provide effective checks and bal-
ances upon an Executive agency, and is ultimately responsible for the 
IRS’s abuse of § 7502.  In one egregious example, the Sixth Circuit in 
BMC Bankcorp196 cowered behind unreported opinions while it all but 
conceded the righteousness of the taxpayer’s position.  Like the whining 
prisoner who holds the key to the jail cell in his or her very own pocket, it 
declared itself constrained by its own precedent to affirm the District Court 
  
 192. Sen. Rpt. 90-1014, at 19 (Mar. 15, 1968) (reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2354, 2373); H. R. 
Rpt. 90-1104, at 14 (Feb. 23, 1968) (reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2341, 2354). 
 193. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).  
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with 
two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. 
 194. See former 48 C.F.R. § 14.304-1(b) (removed 64 Fed. Reg. 51837, 51838 (Sept. 24, 1999)).  The 
old 48 C.F.R. § 14.304-1(b) was first promulgated in 48 Fed. Reg. 42171 (Sept. 19, 1983), and was 
derived from the old Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) (formerly known as the Armed Services 
Procurement Regulation (ASPR)) § 2-303.2 (formerly codified at 32 C.F.R. Subpart A). 
 195. E.g. Moore v. IRS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13446, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,599 (M.D. Fla. 
2003); Goldcorp v. U.S., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6486, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,413 (E.D. Mich. 
2002). 
 196. BMC Bankcorp, Inc. v. U.S., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8404, 94-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,335 (W.D. 
Ky. 1994), aff’d, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15147, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,368 (6th Cir. 1995), 
reh’g denied 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32716 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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decision against the taxpayer.197  We thus see how judicial proceedings can 
complicate the process of taxation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was touted by Congress as a “long 
overdue reform measure . . . developed through extensive and lengthy 
study of ways and means of removing tax inequities and tax restraints” 
whose “passage will lead to increased employment and a higher standard 
of living.”198  The 1954 Code revision purportedly included “a rearrange-
ment of the provisions to place them in a more logical sequence, the dele-
tion of obsolete material, and an attempt to express the internal revenue 
laws in a more understandable manner,”199 “to remove inequities, to end 
harassment of the taxpayer, and to reduce tax barriers to future expansion 
of production and employment.”200  Plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose. 
Taxation is a dynamic process that interacts with the environment and 
the times.  It not only is susceptible to political, social and economic events 
and practices, but also impacts itself upon those political, social and eco-
nomic events and practices, often in a manner quite unrelated to the pur-
pose behind imposing the tax in the first place. 201  It requires hands-on 
  
 197. BMC Bankcorp, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15147, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,368 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
 
We must affirm the judgment of the district court. While we express no opinion on ei-
ther the strength of the proof offered by BMC to show that the 1988 refund claim was 
timely mailed to the IRS or the soundness of the decisions of the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits holding contrary to our decisions in Miller and Surowka, we are constrained 
to follow the clear precedent of this Circuit [emphasis added]. In both Miller and Su-
rowka, we squarely rejected the plaintiffs’ ‘attempts to introduce extrinsic evidence 
other than the postmark or mail receipts to prove timely filing, and concluded that the 
only exceptions to the physical delivery rule available to taxpayers are the two set out 
in section 7502. Miller, 784 F.2d at 730-731; Surowka, 909 F.2d 148 at 150. That rule 
is dispositive of this case [footnotes omitted].  Id. 
 
 198. H.R. Rpt. 83-1337, at 1-2(Mar. 9, 1954) (reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4025); Sen. Rpt. 
83-1622, 1-2 (Apr. 5, 1954),  Sen. Fin. Comm. Report on Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (1954) (re-
printed in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4629).  The introductory materials to the respective House and 
Senate documents were mostly verbatim to one another. 
 199. H.R. Rpt. 83-1337, at 1-2 (Mar. 9, 1954);  Sen. Rpt. 83-1622, 1-2 (Apr. 5, 1954)   
 200. Id. 
 201. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, ch. 16, 157 (Everyman’s 
Library, no. 590, J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1969) (orginally published 1817) (“[Taxation] frequently 
operates very differently from the intention of the legislature by its indirect effects.”). Taxation statutes 
sometimes operate diametrically opposite from their legislative intent. See e.g. In re Rockefeller, 773 
N.Y.S.2d 529, 555 (Surrog. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2003).  
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management, and oftentimes the tax administrators must focus special at-
tention on particular types of taxes or taxpayers, issues, or problems.202 
Accordingly, any system of taxation will inevitably grow inefficient and 
dysfunctional over time, as artifacts from ongoing events accumulate in the 
statutes, regulations, administrative practices, the culture of the bureaucracy, 
and society as a whole.203  Increased international trade and commerce, and 
the growing regulation of such commerce, by treaty or otherwise, inevitably 
accelerates the rate at which such artifacts accumulate.  Changes in federal 
taxation, even if made in the name of tax simplification, cannot help but 
complicate state taxation schemes crafted in light of and geared toward the 
previous federal scheme.204 
Much as houses periodically require painting, automobile engines 
brakes require servicing, pianos and other musical instruments recurrently 
require tuning, lawns must be mowed and hedges need pruning, a taxation 
scheme likewise requires a periodic overhaul.  A half century after the ba-
sic Internal Revenue Code we use today made its debut,205 those who now 
  
The income tax benefit obtainable by the substitution of [a non-New York resident trustee] is clearly in the 
interests of the beneficiaries. Indeed, the frequency with which such applications are made reflects an under-
standable eagerness on the part of persons interested in trusts to be rid of the high tax price payable where 
the fiduciary is a New Yorker.  Although no formal tally has been made of the number of such applications, 
it is clear that their combined result — a loss of trust business by this State — is sufficiently serious to 
suggest that New York’s high fiduciary income tax may be counterproductive to the State’s overall eco-
nomic interests. The New York legislature is urged to evaluate the present fiduciary income tax scheme in 
light of its negative repercussions, including the trend embodied by applications such as the one presently 
before the court. Id. 
 202. See e.g. Kooi v. Chu, 129 A.D.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept, 1987) (upholding an enforce-
ment initiative by a new taxation administration against New York State Department of Taxation & 
Finance employees who failed to file their own income tax returns); McGee v. Hester, 815 F.2d 1193, 
1194 (8th Cir. 1987) (“In 1979, [the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission] commenced a crack-
down upon the illegal import of untaxed out-of-state liquor into the State of Tennessee. The object of 
the crackdown was to arrest Tennessee residents importing such liquor into the State.”), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 963 (1987); Lerman v. Commr., 939 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991) (“This case involves the continu-
ing saga of a crackdown by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on a tax shelter device we will call 
the ‘option-straddle transaction’ and the divers[e] attempts of various taxpayers to avoid the conse-
quences of this crackdown.“), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984 (1991); U.S. Dept. of Just., Justice Depart-
ment Files Suit To Stop Illegal Tax Scheme, News Release No. 03-511 (Sept. 17, 2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ tax/03_tax_511.htm (Sept. 17, 2003) (“The suit is part of the Justice Depart-
ment’s continuing nationwide effort to combat promoters of illegal tax schemes and scams.”). Carlton 
Smith, State is Planning a Sales-Tax Crackdown, Seattle Times B-3 (Aug. 15, 1990) (reporting Wash-
ington State Department of Revenue’s efforts to enforce sales tax compliance among merchants); see 
also Mexico Plans Tax Crackdown, Financial Times (London) 6 (Jan. 16, 1997) (reporting enforcement 
efforts of Mexican government to pursue tax evaders and their unpaid taxes).  
 203. Cf. 2 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 89 (F. Rosenthal, trans., Bollingen Ser. XLIII, Pantheon Books, 
1958) (completed 1377) (pagination in original Arabic version:  II, 79) (“It should be known that at the 
beginning of the dynasty, taxation yields a large revenue from small assessments.  At the end of the 
dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from large assessments.”). 
 204. See e.g. Mark L. Silow, The Decoupling of Pennsylvania’s Estate Tax, 229 Legal Intelligencer 5  
(Nov. 25, 2003); Joshua S. Rubenstein, Federal ‘Repeal’ of Estate Tax Puts Burden on States, 228 
N.Y.L.J. 9 (Sept. 9, 2002). 
 205. See supra n. 10. 
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call for its total revision have no trouble marshalling illustrative exhibits to 
buttress their arguments. 
 
